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TAXATION WITHOUT LIQUIDATION:
RETHINKING “ABILITY TO PAY”
SERGIO PAREJA*
This Article proposes a novel way to tax wealth transfers.
Specifically, it suggests that we divide all assets transferred by gift or bequest
into two classes—illiquid assets and liquid assets. The recipient should
include those assets in income but be allowed two options. With respect to
illiquid assets, the recipient should be able to avoid immediate income
inclusion if he takes the property with an income-tax basis of zero. With
respect to liquid assets, the recipient should be allowed a full income-tax
deduction if he rolls the gift or bequest into a deductible IRA. The
combination of these simple rules would be much more equitable than our
current system, and it would prevent people from having to sell illiquid assets
to pay taxes.
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INTRODUCTION
[T]he most important aspect of great fortunes is not the luxury
which they engender, nor yet the envy and discontent which
they excite; it is the tremendous power which they give over
men, and—it seems—over nations. We may well hesitate about
depriving a man of what he himself has fought for and won by
his ability or his luck. But to make his conquest hereditary, to
put this enormous influence into the hands of a man who may
be entirely unfitted for it, violates every principle of law and
policy for which the government stands.1
People think our tax system is a mess, and many books propose
solutions to this purported problem.2 Most major proposals either
permanently repeal all federal wealth-transfer taxes3 or retain some form
1.
James M. Morton, Jr., The Theory of Inheritance, 8 HARV. L. REV. 161, 167
(1894).
2.
See, e.g., NEAL BOORTZ & JOHN LINDER, THE FAIR TAX BOOK: SAYING
GOODBYE TO THE INCOME TAX AND THE IRS (2005); STEVE FORBES, FLAT TAX
REVOLUTION: USING A POSTCARD TO ABOLISH THE IRS (2005); WILLIAM H. GATES, SR. &
CHUCK COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR COMMONWEALTH: WHY AMERICA SHOULD TAX
ACCUMULATED FORTUNES (2003); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY
RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR, AND COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES (2008);
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER
TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005); EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT: HOW TO
MAKE THE TAX SYSTEM BETTER AND SIMPLER (2002).
3.
See, e.g., BOORTZ & LINDER, supra note 2, at 75 (arguing that we repeal our
current federal tax system, including estate and gift taxes, and replace it with a flat-rate
national sales tax); MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 6 (arguing that we repeal our current
federal tax system, including estate and gift taxes, and replace it with a progressive
national sales tax). Our current federal wealth-transfer taxes include the estate tax, the
gift tax, and the generation-skipping-transfer tax. I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2501, 2601 (West
2008).
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of wealth-transfer taxation with significant exemption amounts and,
frequently, special protection for family farms and small businesses.4
This Article takes a different approach. It proposes that we tax wealth
transfers without any special carve-outs for farms and businesses.
Instead, we should divide all wealth transfers into the following two asset
classes: (1) cash or cash equivalents (―liquid assets‖), and (2) everything
else (―illiquid assets‖). A different method of taxation should apply to
each of these two asset classes. This approach is simple, it encourages
savings, and it never would force people to borrow or sell assets to pay
taxes.
Our tax system aims to tax people based on their ability to pay.5 As
a society, we believe that it is fairer to make a billionaire pay more taxes
than a homeless person. As a result, we have not seen any modern
proposal to charge a head tax on each person regardless of that person‘s
wealth or income; even flat-tax proposals determine the tax owed based
on a percentage of the taxpayer‘s income.6 The difficulty lies in
measuring a person‘s ability to pay. In doing this, should we consider all
assets available to the taxpayer, such as real estate, or should we consider
only the person‘s liquid assets, such as cash and publicly-traded
securities?
Our current federal income-tax system generally does not
distinguish between liquid or illiquid assets.7 Unless there is a statutory
exception,8 it taxes all accessions to wealth regardless of whether the
accession is of cash or in-kind assets.9 This approach works well with an

4.
See, e.g., GATES & COLLINS, supra note 2, at 77, 139; GRAETZ, supra note
2, at 160.
5.
See Joseph M. Dodge, Further Thoughts on Realizing Gains and Losses at
Death, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1827, 1840 (1994).
6.
See, e.g., FORBES, supra note 2, at 60.
7.
See I.R.C. § 61(a) (defining gross income as ―all income from whatever
source derived‖). Despite this broad rule, our system does occasionally treat different
types of assets differently. See, e.g., Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 412 (1931) (treating
a sale of stock differently when payment is contingent and deferred); Bedell v. Comm’r,
30 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1929) (treating a conditional promise to pay differently).
8.
Some exceptions include gifts and inheritances, I.R.C. § 102, the receipt of
life insurance proceeds, id. § 101, and pre-death appreciation on capital assets. Id. § 102.
In addition, the taxation of certain accessions to wealth is deferred for administrative
convenience (the realization requirement) and for policy reasons (contributions to
retirement plans). See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX
LAW 52–53, 606–09 (4th ed. 2002).
9.
See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). This modern
broad view of income was ―another important milestone in a long evolutionary process
whereby an earlier, narrower view of income has been periodically ‗altered largely as a
consequence of a change in the Court‘s personnel.‘‖ L. Hart Wright, The Effect of the
Source of Realized Benefits upon the Supreme Court’s Concept of Taxable Receipts, 8
STAN. L. REV. 164, 201 (1955–56) (quoting Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 140
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income tax on wages and on business income because the amount of tax
owed is based upon the amount of wages or business income received,
which is almost always cash.10 Thus, in general, nobody should need to
borrow or sell assets to pay taxes on wages or business income.
Gifts and inheritances are different from wage and business income
because the assets transferred are frequently illiquid. Thus, the heir who
receives valuable artwork, a home, a farm, or a business may need to sell
or borrow against the inheritance to pay any taxes that might be owed.
Most Americans are not affected by this because our tax system excludes
gifts and inheritances from income for income-tax purposes.11 Instead,
we have a separate wealth-transfer-tax system applicable to gifts and
bequests that targets the very wealthy.12 This separate tax system
exempts huge sums from these wealth-transfer taxes,13 and the system
contains special provisions for certain illiquid assets, such as farms and
businesses.14 Under this system, the transferor, or her estate, pays the
transfer tax.15 Recipients of assets received by bequest then take those
assets with an income-tax basis equal to the assets‘ fair market value on
the decedent‘s date of death (stepped-up basis at death),16 while
recipients of assets by gift take those assets with the transferor‘s basis
(carryover basis).17 This approach has not worked, in large part because
opponents of wealth-transfer taxes have succeeded in convincing the
general public that these taxes are forcing people to liquidate their

(1952) (Black, J., dissenting)); see also Joseph M. Dodge, The Story of Glenshaw Glass:
Towards a Modern Concept of Gross Income, in TAX STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT
TEN LEADING FEDERAL INCOME TAX CASES 15 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2002).
10.
A notable exception is a barter transaction. This generally is taxable even if
no cash is received. See Irs.gov, Barter Exchanges, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/
small/article/0,,id=113437,00.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
11.
I.R.C. § 102.
12.
See id. §§ 2001, 2501, 2601.
13.
The lifetime exemption amount, not including ―annual exclusion gifts‖ of
$12,000 per donee, currently is $1 million for inter vivos gifts and $3.5 million for
transfers at death. See id. §§ 2010(c), 2503(b), 2505(a)(1).
14.
See id. §§ 2032A, 2057, 6166.
15.
See STEPHANIE WILLBANKS, FEDERAL TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS
109–16 (2004).
16.
I.R.C. § 1014(a). The basis technically is ―stepped up‖ or ―stepped down‖
to the assets‘ fair market value on the decedent‘s date of death under § 1014(a)(1) or, if
the alternate valuation date is used on the decedent‘s estate tax return, the basis is the fair
market value on the alternate valuation date under § 1014(a)(2).
17.
Id. § 1015(a). It is also commonly referred to as a transferred basis or a
substituted basis. If the transferred asset‘s fair market value is lower than basis at the time
of transfer, the transferee takes the property with a carryover basis for gain purposes and
a fair market value basis for loss purposes. Id.
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inheritances.18 As a result, we are at the brink of either having no wealthtransfer taxes or a transfer-tax system that would allow people to inherit
millions of dollars completely tax free.
Several scholars have argued that we should abandon estate and gift
taxes and, instead, tax the recipient by including gifts and inheritances in
the recipient‘s income19 or by separately taxing the receipt, rather than
the transfer, of gifts or inheritances.20 Other scholars have argued that we
should treat death like a sale and impose a capital-gains tax on all
untaxed appreciation at death.21 None of the approaches addresses the
liquidity issue in a way that will change the public perception of forced
sales to pay taxes.
This Article proposes that we directly address this public perception
issue. We can do this by treating all accessions to wealth, whether earned
or inherited, similarly while also recognizing the unique liquidity issues
that occur with gifts and inheritances. Specifically, this Article proposes
that (1) the current wealth-transfer taxes, which include the federal estate
and gift taxes and the generation-skipping-transfer tax (―GST tax‖),
should be repealed permanently;22 and (2) exclusions of gratuitous
receipts and life-insurance proceeds from income23 should also be
repealed. These income exclusions should be replaced with a provision
that allows the transferee to exclude the receipt of illiquid assets from
18.
Advocates of our current wealth transfer-tax system have failed to persuade
the public that it is a system worth keeping. The success of the estate-tax repeal
movement, which has achieved a large exemption amount and a one year repeal of the
estate tax, is evidence of this failure. GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 32–33, 41–43.
19.
See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including
Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1978); Charles O. Galvin, Taxing
Gains at Death: A Further Comment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1525 (1993); Charles O. Galvin,
To Bury the Estate Tax, Not to Praise It, 52 TAX NOTES 1413 (1991); Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25
CONN. L. REV. 1 (1992); John K. McNulty, A Transfer Tax Alternative: Inclusion under
the Income Tax, 4 TAX NOTES 24 (1976).
20.
See, e.g., Lily Batchelder, Taxing Privilege More Effectively: Replacing the
Estate Tax with an Inheritance Tax (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Working
Paper No. 100, 2007), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1104&context=nyu/lewp.
21.
See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, A Deemed Realization Approach Is Superior to
Carryover Basis (and Avoids Most of the Problems of the Estate and Gift Tax), 54 TAX L.
REV. 421 (2001). In this article, Professor Dodge provides for the possibility of a limited
exception to the general realization-at-death rule for certain illiquid assets, such as family
farms and small-business interests. These assets would receive a carryover basis. See
infra text accompanying note 154.
22.
Currently, the Federal Estate Tax and GST Tax are repealed for one year—
2010. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 501, 115 Stat. 39, 69. The Federal Gift Tax is not repealed. Id. A discussion of the
details of the GST Tax is beyond the scope of this Article.
23.
I.R.C. §§ 101(a), 102(a) (West 2008).
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income. If the transferee does this, the stepped-up basis at death24 and the
carryover basis for gifts25 should be replaced with a stepped-down-tozero basis for gifts and bequests of these excluded illiquid assets. Finally,
the recipient of liquid assets should be allowed an income-tax deduction
for any portion of the gift or inheritance that he transfers to a deductible
IRA.26 The combination of these relatively simple rules would create a
fair and simple wealth-transfer-tax system that would not force anybody
to borrow or sell assets to pay taxes.
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I provides the historical
framework that led to our current tax system. This history helps to
explain why and how we should tax wealth transfers. Part II discusses
the problems with our current wealth-transfer taxes. Part III discusses the
variety of approaches, real and proposed, that now exist for taxing wealth
transfers. Part IV discusses my proposal in detail. Part V concludes that
the adoption of this proposal would result in a more equitable and simple
system of wealth-transfer taxation.
I. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
Professor Michael Graetz of Yale has proposed an insightful and
creative reformation of our current tax system that he calls the
―Competitive Tax Plan.‖27 At its most basic level, he proposes that we
enact a federal value-added tax (VAT) and exempt families earning
$100,000 or less in annual income from the income tax.28 My proposal

24.
See supra note 16.
25.
There is also a limited carryover basis for assets transferred at death during
the year 2010. See I.R.C. §§ 1014(f), 1022. This too should be repealed. See infra Part
IV.C.1.
26.
See infra Part IV.B.3. More specifically, the limitation on amounts that may
be put into a deductible IRA in a given year should be increased by the amount of
inheritance or gift included in the recipient‘s income in that year. Currently, the limitation
on the amount that may be transferred to a deductible IRA each year is $5,000, with some
exceptions and special rules. I.R.C. § 219(b)(5).
27.
See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 4. Although the most recent and complete
statement of this proposal can be found in the cited book, this book was based on the
following earlier essay, Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh
Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261 (2002). That essay was adapted largely
from another Graetz book, MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX: WHAT IT IS, HOW
IT GOT THAT WAY, AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE (1999), and the Erwin N. Griswold
Lecture delivered to the American College of Tax Counsel in New Orleans, Louisiana on
January 19, 2002. Graetz, 112 YALE L.J. 261, 261 n.†.
28.
GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 83. More specifically, the Competitive Tax Plan
proposes that Congress do the following: (1) enact a 10–14 percent VAT on a broad base
of goods and services; (2) exempt all businesses with revenue of less than $100,000 per
year from collecting this tax; (3) eliminate the income tax and income-tax-return filing
requirements for families earning less than $100,000 per year and for individuals earning
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ideally should be enacted in connection with a plan such as this because
it would reduce the number of people directly affected by the proposal to
a very small percentage of our population. Reducing the impact of this
proposal is probably necessary to make it politically palatable. Graetz
promotes his plan as an effort to return to the original purpose of the
income tax.29 A look at the history of our tax system uncovers our core
tax-law values and provides insight into potentially better systems.
A. The 1894 Tax
Excise taxes and tariffs on imported goods, which were our main
form of federal taxation at the founding of our country, were effectively
consumption taxes.30 Excise taxes and tariffs on luxurious imported
items would have been paid by those with the greatest ability to pay.31 As
Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1790:
[T]he collection of taxes . . . has been as yet only by duties on
consumption. As these fall principally on the rich, it is a
general desire to make them contribute the whole money we
want, if possible. And we have a hope that they will furnish
enough for the expenses of government and the interest of our
whole public debt, foreign and domestic.32
In addition, because people generally would have purchased these
luxury items only if they had the cash to buy them, liquidity to pay taxes
less than $50,000 per year; (4) lower the income-tax rate to a rate of 20–25 percent; (5)
eliminate most deductions other than incentives for home ownership, charitable
contributions, large medical expenses, and employer-sponsored retirement and health
plans; (6) reduce the federal corporate income-tax rate to 15–20 percent; (7) do not make
any changes to payroll taxes; (8) retain the federal estate and gift taxes, but increase the
exemption amounts and provide special relief for family farms and small businesses; (9)
either provide payroll-tax adjustments or a ―smart card‖ to low-income people to avoid
increasing taxes on them with the VAT; and (10) encourage states to do the same as the
federal government. Id. passim. The exemption amounts of $50,000 and $100,000 would
be adjusted for inflation. Id. at 107.
29.
Id. at 87.
30.
See id. at 64, 85. It is worth noting that individual states had different forms
of taxation, including property taxes, that were not consumption taxes. The focus of this
Article, however, is on our federal tax system.
31.
This is by virtue of the fact that luxury items by their very nature can be
afforded only by those who can afford such luxuries. Excise taxes, such as the infamous
―Whiskey Tax,‖ occasionally affected the nonrich. See Act of March 3, 1791, ch. 15, 1
Stat. 199. It is worth noting that the extensive use of whiskey as currency in rural
Pennsylvania meant that a federal excise tax on whiskey effectively served as an income
tax in these areas. See WILLIAM HOGELAND, THE WHISKEY REBELLION 64–70 (2006).
32.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Comte de Moustier (December 3, 1790) in
18 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 119 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1971).
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would not have been a problem. By the 1860s, however, the government
needed additional revenue to fight the Civil War, and it decided to seek it
with an income tax and an inheritance tax.33 These taxes, too, were
focused on the wealthy, but they had the limited purpose of funding the
war effort.34 Not long after the war ended, these taxes were repealed.35
By 1890, it was apparent that wealthy industrialists did not spend all
their wealth and were accumulating money tax free.36 As the
government‘s revenue needs increased, Congress, in 1890, merely
expanded tariffs to reach more nonluxury items, thus affecting average
Americans.37 Specifically, these new import duties were levied on many
―raw materials used by ordinary people . . . [including] wool, twine,
barbed wire, iron fence posts, salt, and lumber.‖38 Because these new
taxes were imposed on nonluxury items, those with less ability to pay
would have been forced to pay out a much greater percentage of their
income and overall wealth to taxes than those who did not need to spend
everything they made.39 The enactment of an income tax was a deliberate
effort to shift the bulk of the tax burden back to the wealthiest sector of
our society by taxing unspent income of the wealthy while reducing
tariffs on nonluxury items.40 It was intended ―to fund a reduction in
tariffs and to counterbalance the effect of those taxes on consumption
with a tax more closely linked to people‘s ability to pay.‖41 As Senator
John K. Shield said in 1913,
It is a part of the history of this country that much of the
personal property owned by everyone, and the great
accumulations of wealth in the hands of the few, had for years

33.
See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, 14 Stat. 471, 478, 480; Act of July 4,
1864, res. 77, 13 Stat. 417; Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223, 281, 283; Act of
July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 473, 474; Act of August 5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292.
34.
See WILLBANKS, supra note 15, at 4; see also RANDOLPH E. PAUL,
TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 22–29 (1954).
35.
Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, 16 Stat. 256.
36.
MICHAEL KAZIN, A GODLY HERO: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN
32 (2006).
37.
See Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509, 551 (1894);
McKinley Tariff Act, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567, 617 (1890).
38.
KAZIN, supra note 36, at 32.
39.
For a fascinating history of this movement, as well as the prominent role of
William Jennings Bryan in it, see id. at 51–222.
40.
See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 85.
41.
Id. (emphasis added). Somewhat weakening Professor Graetz‘s assertion
that the income tax was meant to supplement the foundational consumption tax (i.e.,
tariffs on imported goods), Professor Kazin notes that William Jennings Bryan, the
drafter of this tax act, ―would have preferred a graduated income tax that would replace
the tariff entirely.‖ KAZIN, supra note 36, at 51.
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escaped taxation. They could not be taxed directly without
apportionment, which was not deemed advisable. The income
tax law of 1894 was enacted to remedy this injustice and to
make this property bear its just proportion of the expenses of
Government.42
The income tax thus was designed as a targeted, supplemental43 tax on
the unspent income of the wealthy as a way to return to a tax system
based on ability to pay.
The 1894 income tax44 was simple enough. The tax targeted the
wealthy and would have only affected less than 0.2 percent of the
population.45 It was a flat 2 percent tax on income over $4,000.46 Rather
than provide for a separate tax on inheritances, as was done in 1862–
71,47 the 1894 tax took the unusual step of treating gifts and inheritances
of personal property as income.48 It is not entirely clear why this was
done. Congress could have attempted to reach inheritances with a
separate tax; perhaps it was viewed as simpler and fairer to group
inheritances and business- and wage-income together.49 The
congressional record surrounding the 1894 tax act demonstrates that
congressmen were aware that it was unusual to treat inheritances as
income rather than to tax them separately:
Mr. PLATT. I do not think there ought to be included in the
yearly income which is to be taxed, either the real estate which
may be received by devise or personal property which is
received by inheritance or gift.
Mr. HILL. I am going to make a motion also in regard to that
provision.
Mr. PLATT. I do not think it is any part of the yearly income. I
think it is entirely foreign to the scheme of the bill. I wish to
state, while I am up, that there is no feature of the English
42.
43.

S. Doc. No. 63-171, at 14 (1913).
It was supplemental because it was on top of the usual excise taxes and

tariffs.
44.
Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509.
45.
See KAZIN, supra note 36, at 51, 61 (explaining that in a nation of seventy
million people fewer than a hundred thousand Americans earned enough to qualify).
46.
Id. at 51.
47.
Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, 16 Stat. 256; Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12
Stat. 432, 483.
48.
Tariff Act of 1894, 28 Stat. at 553. This act was held to be unconstitutional,
on other grounds, in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895).
See also Kornhauser, supra note 19, at 13.
49.
Looking at both types of accessions to wealth certainly gives a more
accurate picture of the recipient‘s total ability to pay.
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income tax which is so odious in England as what they call the
death duties. That is the name which they have given this sort
of taxation in England. The death duties are very odious, and
they ought to be odious in this country. They are no part of a
person‘s real income.
Mr. CHANDLER. There seems to be no doubt at all that the
bill adopts an inheritance tax right into the body of it.
Mr. HILL. And calls it an income tax.
Mr. CHANDLER. It purports to be an income tax, but it is an
inheritance tax upon personal property . . . . I think it is a
fundamental error to undertake to put an inheritance tax into an
income-tax bill.50

Why did Congress only include inheritances of personal property in
income and not inheritances of real property? From the congressional
record, there appeared to be concern that taxing inheritances of real
estate would be an unconstitutional, unapportioned, direct tax.
Specifically, Mr. Chandler said, ―I think he is right in maintaining that
you cannot in the pending bill constitutionally tax an inheritance of real
estate.‖51 There is little else in the historical record to explain the reason
for the exclusion of real estate, but liquidity may have been a concern. A
tax on an inheritance of real estate might force the heir to borrow against
or sell the land. Whatever the reason, the system designed in 1894
created few liquidity problems.
The 1894 tax act ultimately died when it was held to be an
unconstitutional direct tax that was not apportioned in accordance with
population.52 This ruling ultimately led to the 16th Amendment to the
Constitution—a change that, beginning in 1913, allowed Congress to
levy income taxes without apportionment.53
B. The 1913 and 1916 Taxes
The 1913 tax act, which is the direct precursor of our current tax
law, did not include gifts and bequests in income.54 This tax was
graduated.55 After a $3,000 exemption ($4,000 for a husband and wife

50.
26 CONG. REC. 6821 (1894).
51.
Id. But see Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 347 (1875) (noting that
capitation taxes and taxes on permanent real estate are the only taxes that must be levied
in proportion to numbers).
52.
Pollack, 158 U.S. at 637.
53.
See KAZIN, supra note 36, at 222.
54.
Revenue Act 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 167.
55.
See 38 Stat. at 166.
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filing together),56 the tax started at rates ranging from 1 percent up to 6
percent, at income over $500,000.57 In the early years of this tax (1918–
32), only 5.6 percent of the United States population filed income-tax
returns with a tax due.58 This percentage dropped to only 3.7 percent of
the total U.S. population from 1933–39.59 Thus, this income tax,
although affecting vastly more people than the 1894 income tax (which
affected less than 0.2 percent of the population), still affected an
extremely small percentage of our country‘s population.
The change in the treatment of gifts and inheritances from 1894–
1913 arose not out of a desire to make gifts and inheritances tax-free
transfers, but was a push to tax gifts and inheritances at a higher rate than
wages and business income.60 Specifically, U.S. Representative Cordell
Hull, the floor manager of the bill, stated in 1913 that a tax on gifts and
inheritances would need to have ―rather highly graduated rates, so that
this tax would properly be contained in a separate enactment.‖61 As
further evidence that this was at least one rationale for the change,
Congress enacted the federal estate tax just three years later, in 1916.62
This tax had much higher rates than the income tax.63
56.
38 Stat. at 168. In addition to the individual and spousal exemption
amounts, there were deductions for business expenses; interest on debt, state, county,
school, municipal, and school taxes; actual losses not compensated by insurances;
worthless debts; and depreciation of business property. 38 Stat. at 167.
57.
38 Stat. at 166.
58.
GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 86.
59.
Id.
60.
Another rationale commonly given for the § 102 exclusion of gifts and
inheritances from income is, as Professor Joseph Dodge has said, because of ―the early
20th century view that ‗original endowment‘ (a form of ‗capital‘) could not be income
under an income tax.‖ Dodge, supra note 21, at 431. Dodge also notes that ―[t]he chief
contemporary political argument against [a provision including gifts and bequests in
income] was that it would have duplicated state inheritance taxes.‖ Id. at 431 n.44. He
also notes that ―a proposal by Senator Norris to add an inheritance tax to the 1913 Act
was defeated.‖ Id.
61.
50 CONG. REC. 506 (1913); Wright, supra note 9, at 173–74.
62.
Act of September 8, 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756. Another reason for the
enactment of the federal estate tax three years later was falling revenue from tariffs and
anticipated revenue needs to fight World War I. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION,
110TH CONG., HISTORY, PRESENT LAW, AND ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL WEALTH
TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM 5 [hereinafter FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM],
available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-108-07.pdf. The federal gift tax was enacted in
1924. Id.
63.
Compare Revenue Act 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 167 with Act of
September 8, 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756. The 1916 estate tax effectively exempted the
first $50,000 of every estate from this tax. See FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM,
supra note 62, at 5. Rates ranged from 1–10 percent (on transferred assets in excess of $5
million). Id. The following year, to pay for World War I expenses, the top rate was
increased to 25 percent on transferred assets in excess of $10 million. Id. During this time
period, the top income-tax rate was 6 percent on incomes in excess of $500,000. Supra
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The 1916 estate tax was different from the 1913 income tax because
the tax base used to determine the amount of estate tax would have
logically consisted of illiquid assets, such as farms, closely-held-business
interests, tangible personal property, and the family home.64 Although
illiquid assets may increase the recipient‘s overall ability to pay, the
recipient may need to sell or borrow against the asset to pay taxes. This
forced sale or loan issue, whether real or perceived, has been a key force
behind the movement to abolish the estate tax.65
C. Back to the Present
Professor Graetz‘s Competitive Tax Plan,66 which looks to the past
for guidance, retains the current federal estate and gift taxes, albeit with
potentially larger exemption amounts and special rules for family farms
and small businesses.67 Graetz also appears to be open to the possibility
of finding an alternate method to tax wealth transfers. Specifically, he
discusses the following: ―alternative ways of taxing large gifts or
bequests of wealth,‖68 an accessions tax,69 a federal inheritance tax,70 or
simply including ―large bequests in the recipients‘ income.‖71 These
possible methods of taxing wealth transfers are discussed in detail later.72
Graetz notes:
It is feasible under either an accessions tax or an inheritance tax
to vary the rate of tax depending upon the recipient‘s affinity to
text accompanying notes 56–57. The reasons for choosing an estate tax, which is a
transferor-focused tax, over an inheritance tax, which focuses on the transferee, included
(1) a belief that it would raise more revenue, (2) a belief that it would supplement state
inheritance taxes, (3) the convenience of modeling our wealth-transfer taxes after the
British system, and (4) the administrative convenience of placing filing burdens on one
wealthy decedent rather than on many heirs. Batchelder, supra note 20, at 14.
64.
The family home is an illiquid asset that has unique value in most families.
See Ann Mumford, Inheritance in Socio-Political Context: The Case for Reviving the
Sociological Discourse of Inheritance Tax Law, 34 J.L. & SOC‘Y 567, 582–83 (2007).
65.
See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 63.
66.
See supra note 28.
67.
GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 160.
68.
Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax
System, supra note 27, at 267 (emphasis added). It is worth noting that his focus is only
on taxing large wealth transfers rather than all wealth transfers that might cause the
recipient to exceed the regular income-exemption amount of his plan (i.e., $50,000 for
singles and $100,000 for families).
69.
Id.
70.
Id. at 268.
71.
Id. (emphasis added). It is worth noting that the focus again is on large
wealth transfers.
72.
See infra Part III.
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the transferor and to adjust the tax for other family
circumstances. Neither tax, for example, need be imposed upon
gifts or bequests of interests in a small business or farm until
the asset is sold outside the family.73
Graetz subsequently notes that, although an accessions tax or
inheritance tax
would fit comfortably in the new tax system proposed here, no
such separate rate tax is necessary. Much of the progressivity
of the nation‘s tax system currently supplied by the estate tax
could be maintained by treating large gifts and bequests as
income to those families whose $100,000 family allowance
does not exempt them from income tax. A flat tax of twentyfive percent would then apply to taxable transfers of large
amounts of wealth. The size of gifts or bequests required to be
included in the recipient‘s income should be set at a level that
maintains at least half the revenue that the estate tax would
have produced.74
Graetz does not specify what he means by ―large‖ amounts of
wealth being subject to the tax. He also does not elaborate on why he
would use a different rate structure from the general income tax and why
the gifts and bequests would not be treated like any other income of the
recipient.75
Currently, about 130 million individual U.S. income-tax returns are
filed each year76 by about 195 million people.77 This represents about 65
percent of our population, a vastly greater percentage of our population
than would have been affected by the 1894 tax act (0.2 percent) and than
was affected by the 1913 tax act in its early years (5.6 percent).78 Graetz

73.
Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax
System, supra note 27, at 268. Like many modern proponents of transfer-tax reform,
Graetz demonstrates a willingness to treat family farms and small businesses as a
different type of wealth subject to special privileges.
74.
Id. at 299 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
75.
As Professor Joseph Dodge has noted, income-tax inclusion of gifts and
inheritances ―does not contemplate a separate rate schedule for gifts and bequests. Such a
separate schedule would contradict a basic premise of the [income inclusion] proposal:
that the source of receipts should not affect tax liability.‖ Dodge, supra note 19, at 1190.
76.
See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 104–05.
77.
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 1304, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RETURNS 2006, at 40 tbl.1.3, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06inalcr.pdf.
78.
One hundred and ninety-five million divided by 305 million. See
Census.gov, U.S. POPClock Projection, http://www.census.gov/population/www/pop
clockus.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
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estimates that his Competitive Tax Plan would reduce the number of
federal individual income-tax returns filed each year by 100 million (to
about 30 million).79 This would free over 150 million people who
currently pay income tax from paying any federal income tax at all,
leaving only about 45 million people to pay federal income tax.80 Thus,
the percentage of people subject to the federal income tax would drop to
about 15 percent of our population.81 While still significantly more than
the 5.6 percent of 1918 and vastly more than the 0.2 percent of 1894, 15
percent is much more in line with the original goals of the income tax
than the 65 percent currently taxed on income.
This history is important because it reminds us that the focus of all
taxes in this country is and has been on ability to pay. It also reminds us
that a consumption tax on nonluxury items, without an additional tax on
unspent wealth or income, generally will result in an increased
concentration of wealth in a few hands. Additionally, this history
reminds us that the first push for a permanent income tax in 1894 treated
accessions to wealth, whether earned or inherited, equally with one
significant exception: the receipt of real estate was not taxed.82 As
mentioned, this meant that liquidity rarely would have been an issue. The
focus of that first income tax, therefore, was to impose a supplemental,
nonconsumption tax on those with the greatest ability to pay without
requiring them to borrow or sell illiquid assets. The 1913 and 1916 taxes
expanded the supplemental-tax category to include an income tax on the
wealthy and an estate tax on the very wealthy.83 The latter of these two
taxes, along with the later-enacted GST tax, has been targeted directly
for elimination by some powerful and influential groups.84
II. PROBLEMS WITH ESTATE, GIFT, AND GST TAXES
A. Why Tax Wealth Transfers?
The reasons why people support transfer taxes vary. Some common
reasons include ability to pay, equality of opportunity, and wealth
redistribution.85 The concept of ability to pay in this context has
79.
See GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 104–05.
80.
See id. at 84.
81.
Forty-five million divided by 305 million.
82.
Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509.
83.
See Act of September 8, 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756; Revenue Act 1913, ch.
16, 38 Stat. 114, 167,
84.
See generally GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 6–7.
85.
See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121
HARV. L. REV. 469 (2007) (arguing that inheritance taxes help to provide greater equality
of opportunity); see also Batchelder, supra note 20, at 6 (arguing that an inheritance tax
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historically referred to the assets available to the recipient of gifts and
inheritances, regardless whether those assets are liquid or illiquid.86
Equality of opportunity and wealth redistribution are closely related and,
in the interest of brevity, grouped together as ―wealth redistribution‖ in
this Article. Of course, wealth-transfer taxes also are a small but
significant source of federal revenue.87
Public figures who support the estate, gift, and GST tax often seem
to do so because they value wealth redistribution.88 They want to
minimize great concentrations of wealth, or an inequality of property
ownership that starts at birth.89 This goal has existed since very early in
our country‘s history. As Thomas Jefferson said in 1785, ―Another
means of silently lessening the inequality of property is to exempt all
from taxation below a certain point, and to tax the higher portions of
property in geometrical progression as they rise.‖90
The reason to reduce inequality of property varies. Economist Henry
Simons, for example, stated that there is something inherently ―unlovely‖
about inequality.91 Perhaps the strongest argument in support of wealth
would ―mitigate widening economic disparities, promote equality of opportunity, and
make our tax system better attuned to an individual‘s ability to pay‖).
86.
See Dodge, supra note 19, at 1188–90.
87.
Net estate and gift taxes collected from 1999–2007 ranged from a low of
$21.9 billion to a high of $28.9 billion per year. Compare INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
PUB. 55B, DATA BOOK 2007, at 3 tbl.1 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-soi/07databk.pdf, with INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DATA BOOK 1999–2006,
available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=102174,00.html.
88.
See generally GATES & COLLINS, supra note 2.
89.
Id. People who espouse this view tend to also support progressive incometax rates. See Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J.
259, 270–73 (1983). The pros and cons of progressive taxation of income are beyond the
scope of this Article. Due primarily to the fact that income taxation in this country has
always included progressive rates, the conclusions assume that, above some exemption
amount, there always will be at least some degree of progressivity in our income-tax
system. For the classic article against progressive income taxation, see Walter J. Blum &
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417
(1952). In the article the authors challenge all arguments for progressivity made in the
name of equal sacrifice and ability to pay. Id. at 445–86. Instead, they argue that the only
legitimate, albeit questionable, grounds for progressivity are based on an attempt to
redistribute wealth. Id. at 465–66. Strong cases for progressive taxation include Martin J.
McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for
Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (1998), and Lawrence Zelenak & Kemper
Moreland, Can the Graduated Income Tax Survive Optimal Tax Analysis?, 53 TAX L.
REV. 51 (1999).
90.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (October 28, 1785) in 8
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 682 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1953).
91.
HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 18–19 (1938). This is not
meant to be a comprehensive list of reasons why people support reducing an inequality of
property. The list of conceivable reasons why people might support this is extensive. For
example, the rich arguably should pay more taxes because they benefit more from a
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redistribution as a worthy goal is the notion that concentrated wealth is a
threat to democracy.92 According to Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah of the
University of Michigan, this is so because (1) great wealth can buy
political favors, (2) great wealth can finance runs for political office, and
(3) great wealth ―degrades relationships among people (cultural, social,
and political) and eventually undermines the sense of community on
which a democratic polity must rest.‖93 A less obvious reason why some
wealth redistribution is good is because, as the wealthy Andrew Mellon
said, ―[It] mitigate[s] radical demands for restructuring the capitalist
system.‖94 Stated differently, the wealthy benefit from reduced wealth
disparities because society is less likely to reach a breaking point in
which most of the upper class‘s wealth is confiscated by masses of poor
people.
To summarize, people generally rely on three broad categories of
reasons to support taxing wealth transfers. First, our society is better, in
terms of people starting off on relatively equal footing and in terms of
having a strong democracy, if hereditary wealth disparities are
minimized (wealth redistribution). Second, our tax system is fairer, and
thus more likely to be respected, if people with the greatest ability pay
the greatest share of taxes (ability to pay). Finally, these taxes raise
revenue, reducing the stress on other revenue sources (revenue raising).
Since 1916, the federal estate tax has been the primary means by which
the federal government taxes wealth transfers.95 This primary tax has
been backed up by the later additions of the federal gift tax96 and the
federal generation-skipping-transfer tax.97

stable society. In addition, a larger middle class, and therefore less inequality, arguably
would benefit the economy as a whole. A separate article could conceivably be written on
the pros and cons of these arguments.
92.
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and
Progressive Taxation, 111 YALE L.J. 1391, 1412 (2002). Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis said it best: ―We can have a democratic society or we can have great
concentrated wealth in the hands of a few. We cannot have both.‖ JEFF GATES,
DEMOCRACY AT RISK: RESCUING MAIN STREET FROM WALL STREET xxxv (2000).
93.
Avi-Yonah, supra note 92, at 1412.
94.
Id. at 1410.
95.
See WILLBANKS, supra note 15, at 3–7.
96.
The federal gift tax became effective in 1924, was repealed in 1926, and
became effective again in 1932. See FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM, supra
note 62, at 5–6.
97.
The GST was enacted in 1976. See WILLBANKS, supra note 15, at 6. Its
purpose was to prevent wealthy families from avoiding the estate tax at each generation
through the clever use of trusts. See Batchelder, supra note 20, at 15.
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Analyzing Estate, Gift, and GST Taxes

Wealth-transfer taxes have strong opponents with compelling
reasons for being against wealth-transfer taxes. According to Professor
Stephen Vasek of the University of Kentucky, common reasons given for
repeal of transfer taxes include the following:
(1) to improve the low personal saving rate in the U.S.; (2) to
perpetuate the basic ―American dream‖ of providing for one‘s
children and loved ones; (3) to reduce the complexity,
compliance burdens, and administrative burdens of current tax
laws; (4) to prevent the destruction of small businesses and
family farms, and; (5) to end the ―double‖ taxation of income,
first under the income tax law and then again at death under the
estate tax law.98
Another reason commonly given is that it is generally undesirable to tax
capital rather than income or consumption.99
Rather than weighing each of the pro-wealth-transfer-tax arguments
against the anti-wealth-transfer-tax arguments, it is more practical to
analyze these taxes against the backdrop of traditional tax-policy
principles: equity, administrative efficiency, and neutrality.100 Often,
these specific arguments fall within more than one category.101

98.
Stephen Vasek, Death Tax Repeal: Alternative Reform Proposals, 92 TAX
NOTES 955, ¶ 3 (2001). With respect to the incentive to save, see also Michael Boskin, An
Economist’s Perspective on Estate Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES, AND FAMILY PROPERTY
56, 62–64 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977).
99.
See C. Lowell Harriss, Estate Tax Revision and Capital Needs in the
1970’s, in READINGS IN DEATH AND GIFT TAX REFORM 51, 51 (Gersham Goldstein ed.,
1971).
100. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 5 (5th ed. 1987); Joseph T.
Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 568 (1965).
The terminology used and the groupings of items in each category sometimes vary, but
the basic principle is consistent. For a more recent interpretation, see Reuven S. AviYonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 (2006) (identifying efficiency,
equity, and administrability as the three traditional grounds for evaluating tax policy).
101. For example, the taxation of the transfer of small businesses has equity
implications (i.e., it is unfair to tax somebody who inherits publicly traded stock but not
tax somebody who inherits stock in a closely held business), but it also has efficiency
implications (i.e., it does not make sense to charge an exorbitantly high tax on the transfer
of a business if that tax would result in the destruction of the business and, as a result, a
greater loss of long-term tax revenue).
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1. EQUITY

The concept of horizontal equity requires that similarly-situated
taxpayers bear similar tax burdens.102 The concept of vertical equity
requires that taxpayers who are not similarly situated bear tax burdens
relative to their respective abilities to pay.103 Ability to pay in this context
generally does not consider liquidity, despite the fact that liquidity is a
significant issue in the wealth-transfer-tax context.104
Our current wealth-transfer-tax system generally does not
distinguish between transfers of cash or in-kind assets, with some special
exceptions for family farms and small businesses.105 This means that a
recipient of the family home is treated as if she received cash. This rule
is equitable considering that the beneficiary received something of value,
but is inequitable considering that the beneficiary may need to quickly
sell the home in a poor housing market or borrow against it to pay
taxes.106 A beneficiary who inherits cash would not need to do this. As
Professor Edward McCaffery of the University of Southern California
has correctly noted,
102. See John E. Donaldson, The Future of Transfer Taxation: Repeal,
Restructuring and Refinement, or Replacement, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 545
(1993); Richard Schmalbeck, Income Averaging After Twenty Years: A Failed
Experiment in Horizontal Equity, 1984 DUKE L. J. 509, 546.
103. See sources cited id.
104. Professor Joseph Dodge, who prefers to use the term ethics rather than
equity, has described the current view of ability to pay as follows: ―The basic idea is that
individual taxpayers should contribute to a government that performs redistributive and
public good functions according to their respective abilities to pay. In general, ‗ability to
pay‘ refers to economic resources under the taxpayer‘s control, whether in cash or in
kind.‖ Dodge, supra note 5, at 1840. For a discussion of liquidity issues related to wealth
transfers, see STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., TAXATION OF WEALTH
TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY: A DISCUSSION OF SELECTED AREAS FOR POSSIBLE REFORM
14, [hereinafter TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY], available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-23-08.pdf.
105. See I.R.C. §§ 2032A, 2057, 6166 (West 2008); see also TAXATION OF
WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at 15.
106. Attorney Ronald Aucutt argues that a taxpayer does not have an ability to
pay with respect to an appreciated asset until the taxpayer voluntarily realizes gain,
usually by selling the asset. See Ronald D. Aucutt, Further Observations on Transfer Tax
Restructuring: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 42 TAX LAW. 343, 347 (1989). Professor
Dodge responds directly to this view by saying,
But one can have realization without liquidity (for example, an
exchange of publicly traded stock for nonpublicly held restricted
stock) and liquidity without realization (any asset for which a ready
market exists). Nor does the voluntariness of realizations have
anything to do with whether the gains should be taxed, because the
tax system itself (the realization rule) induces people to choose not to
realize gains.
Dodge, supra note 5, at 1840–41 n.66.
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[A]ll of the problems that led the courts to create the realization
requirement . . . are also present at death: assets are still hard to
value, and there may be no cash on hand to pay the tax. It
seems harsh to expect the bereaved to have to sell their
inheritance in order to pay a tax on it.107
The modern assault on the estate tax should cause us to rethink this
concept of ability to pay in the wealth-transfer-tax context. This certainly
seems necessary from a political standpoint.108
The current transfer-tax system, like many reform proposals,
attempts to make special rules that are applicable only to family farms
and small businesses.109 The complexity created by these special rules is
immense, particularly when one considers that those forced to comply
with these rules generally are small-business owners and farmers, and
not large corporate accounting departments. Perhaps more importantly,
special cutouts are not always equitable, for example, when comparing
the beneficiary who receives publicly traded stock with the beneficiary
who inherits an equally valuable family business. Both assets may have
the exact same societal benefit, although the business or farm is treated
more favorably, ostensibly because it creates jobs and its loss may
disrupt the community,110 but more likely because of what it

107. MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 31. But see TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS
FAMILY, supra note 104, at 15 (―The data suggest that many estates that are
comprised largely of farms or other closely held businesses have enough liquid assets to
satisfy estate tax liabilities.‖).
108. The heart of the argument for estate-tax repeal, which, although largely
unsubstantiated, has proven to be very persuasive with most Americans, is that the estate
tax forces heirs to sell assets, such as farms and family businesses, to come up with the
cash to pay estate taxes. See generally GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 2. No new
proposal to reform our wealth-transfer-tax system can ignore the political reality that
people cannot be put into a position in which they might have to sell illiquid assets,
including tangible personal property, such as art and musical instruments, real estate, and
family businesses, to pay transfer taxes. These assets are unique because it might take a
long time to sell them and pressure to sell quickly might greatly reduce the sales price
below market value, they might have personal significance to the heir, and, in the case of
businesses and farms, they might create jobs. The potency of this argument will make any
modern reform effort impossible to enact if it fails to consider the forced-sale issue.
109. See supra text accompanying note 105; TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS
WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at 3 (―The principal criticisms have been that the
provisions are complex and distort taxpayers‘ behavior by encouraging them to hold
active business assets rather than other assets.‖); id. at 23 (―A second broad criticism of
sections 2032A, 6166, and 2057 has been that those provisions favor the holding of
certain assets over other kinds of assets, thereby encouraging planning and distorting
economic behavior.‖); see also James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 868 (2001) (explaining estate-tax provisions applicable to farms and
small businesses).
110. TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at 14.
WITHIN A
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symbolizes—freedom and the American way. Symbolic value is a weak
basis for setting tax policy.
Our current transfer-tax system determines the amount of tax owed
based on the size of the transferor‘s estate rather than on the amount that
each beneficiary receives. Thus, a beneficiary who receives exactly onetenth of a $10 million estate111 will effectively pay more wealth-transfer
taxes by receiving a smaller inheritance than somebody who is the sole
beneficiary of a $1 million estate. This is because the estate tax is
computed based on the total size of the estate, regardless how the estate
is divided up.112 This is not equitable. This phenomenon has efficiency
implications as well, which are discussed later.
As mentioned, a concern raised by opponents of our current
transfer-tax system is that it is a double tax; that is, the transferor pays
taxes when she earns the money, and then the transferor is taxed again on
the same money with transfer taxes when she gives it away. 113 There is
some truth to this argument. With respect to the gift tax, this argument
rings especially true, given that the tax is borne by the transferor.114 With
respect to the estate tax, although occasionally true, the double-tax
argument is weaker for two key reasons. First, the person bearing the
estate tax, in reality, is the beneficiary and not the decedent, who is not
even alive at the time of payment.115 Had that beneficiary worked for the
decedent to earn the same money, say by building a home for the
decedent, the money would be taxable to the beneficiary even though the
decedent had already paid taxes on it. This is the norm as long as those

111. This assumes that estate taxes are apportioned equally among the
beneficiaries.
112. See I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2032, 2051 (West 2008); see also INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., U.S. ESTATE (AND GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER) TAX RETURN, FORM 706
(Rev. Aug. 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f706.pdf (demonstrating
that the estate tax is computed based on the total size of the estate). For this reason, a
transferee-focused transfer tax will be far superior to a transferor-focused tax if a primary
goal is to reduce concentrations of wealth. See Joseph M. Dodge, Comparing a Reformed
Estate Tax with an Accessions Tax and an Income-Inclusion System, and Abandoning the
Generation-Skipping Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 551, 560 (2003); Batchelder, supra note 20,
at 39–40.
113. See supra text accompanying note 98.
114. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., DESCRIPTION AND
ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEMS 19, [hereinafter
ALTERNATIVE WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEMS], available at www.house.gov/jct/x-2208.pdf. This makes it particularly interesting that the gift tax is not repealed under current
law. An argument could be made that the gift tax is borne, at least in part, by the
transferee because the donor would have given the money needed for taxes to the
transferee. Given the tax benefit of holding on to assets until death, especially with the
potential for estate-tax repeal, it seems unlikely that current donors would think in these
terms.
115. See Dodge, supra note 112, at 556; Batchelder, supra note 20, at 5.
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two taxpayers are not in the same taxable unit.116 Second, in most cases,
the stepped-up basis at death117 minimizes any alleged double taxation
that might occur.118
To summarize, our current transfer-tax system has severe equity
problems. First, its efforts to protect family farms and small businesses
result in unfair treatment of heirs of assets other than farms and
businesses, such as publicly traded stock. Second, recipients of in-kind
assets are treated very unfairly compared with recipients of cash because
they may need to sell or borrow against those illiquid assets, often in
unfavorable conditions and under time pressure. Third, the focus on the
transferor‘s estate rather than on the amount each transferee receives is
inequitable because a person who is the sole beneficiary of a moderately
sized estate will often pay less tax than each of many beneficiaries of a
much larger estate. Finally, particularly in the case of gift taxes, the
transferor may be forced to pay double taxes on money because he
chooses to give it away rather than spend it.
2. EFFICIENCY
Traditionally, efficiency concerns are judged in the following two
principal ways: (1) indirect costs (i.e., costs to taxpayers for attempting
to comply with the law), and (2) direct costs (i.e., costs to the
government for administering the tax law).119 Although these concerns
are directly focused on administrative efficiency, this Article takes a
broader view of efficiency concerns and also considers the broader
societal costs of wealth-transfer taxes and failure to achieve a policy
objective as efficiency issues. Thus, if a tax is specifically enacted with
the purpose of increasing tax revenue by encouraging people to start
taxable businesses, and if it fails to encourage people to start businesses,
it would be an inefficient tax.
Wealth-transfer taxes currently collect approximately $22–29 billion
each year,120 or 1–1.5 percent of our federal revenue.121 It is hard to know

116. See Dodge, supra note 19, at 1203–08 (discussing husband and wife as
taxable unit and analyzing the consequences of including and excluding minor children in
the taxable unit).
117. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
118. This same benefit does not apply to inter vivos gifts. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
119. See Donaldson, supra note 102, at 548; see also Schmalbeck, supra note
102, at 529–30; Edward Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55
FORDHAM L. REV. 395, 409–29 (1987).
120. See supra note 87.
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with certainty how efficient estate-tax collection is, but there is
significant evidence that it is one of our least efficient taxes when
considering the costs, direct and indirect, that go into each dollar
collected. Professor Vasek notes that ―the National Federation of
Independent Business estimated that the government and individuals
collectively spend some 65 cents for each dollar of estate and gift tax
collected—that‘s $5–6 billion annually—for enforcement and
compliance activities.‖122 Professor McCaffery takes an even stronger
stance on the issue:
[N]early a century of experience with the estate tax has proven
it to be a failure. The tax is porous and complex. It might even
be counterproductive, costing the government money simply to
have it in place. This is because the tax has a long-term effect
on the incentives to work and save and because it encourages
transactions—like complicated life insurance trusts—that cost
the government income tax revenue. These costs may well
outweigh the limited benefits of the tax.123
In addition to utilizing various trusts, very wealthy people
commonly set up entities, such as limited liability companies and family
limited partnerships, and engage in complex and expensive planning
solely in an effort to reduce the value of their taxable estates.124
Our current wealth-transfer-tax system also appears to have broad
societal costs. Although there is no compelling evidence of it, many
people believe that the estate tax destroys family businesses, causes
families to sell farms, and causes people to spend rather than save.125

121. See NONNA A. NOTO, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: ESTATE AND GIFT TAX
REVENUES—PAST AND PROJECTED IN 2008, at 15 tbl.7 (2008), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts.RL34418_20080319.pdf.
122. Vasek, supra note 98, at n.16 (quoting Reducing the Tax Burden: Hearing
Before the H. Ways and Means Comm., 105th Cong. 92 (1998) (statement of Rep. Jim
McCrery)).
123. MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 66; see also Edward J. McCaffery, The
Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994) (arguing for the
abolishment of the estate tax).
124. See Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-toValue Lines, 43 TAX L. REV. 241, 254–63 (1988); see also infra Part II.B.3; TAXATION OF
WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at 33–49.
125. See Dodge, supra note 5, at 1840 n.63 (―However, insofar as savings are
target- or bequest-oriented, it is more logical to presume that the prospect of future death
taxes would induce a person to save more to achieve the desired after tax result.‖); see
also TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at 24; supra
text accompanying note 98.
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Assuming that these allegations are true, even to the smallest degree, it
would weaken the efficiency rate even further.126
More troubling from an efficiency perspective is the issue of
whether our wealth-transfer-tax system has had any success at carrying
out its most significant goal—reducing concentrations of wealth. It
certainly is not clear that these taxes do anything with respect to wealth
redistribution other than make people feel like something is being
done.127 Furthermore, the basic design of the system is flawed if this is a
goal. By basing the tax on the total size of the estate regardless how it is
divided, our law does not encourage rich individuals to spread out their
wealth by leaving smaller amounts to a large number of individuals.128 A
tax that would focus on the transferee and the amount received by each
transferee would be far more efficient in this respect.129
To summarize, our current wealth-transfer-tax system has severe
efficiency problems. First, the direct costs to the government of trying to
enforce the tax law are extremely high with respect to the revenue the tax
generates. Second, the money that people spend to avoid paying this tax
is extremely high. Third, if it is true that businesses and farms are lost
and people refrain from saving and investing, this would weaken the
efficiency of our wealth-transfer-tax system. Finally, it is poorly
designed to reduce large wealth disparities.
3. NEUTRALITY
The concept of tax neutrality suggests that the Internal Revenue
Code (Code), to the extent possible, should not cause people to alter
behavior solely for tax reasons unless there is a public-policy reason for

126. The weakening results from the fact that a loss of a business or farm or
productive investments would serve to reduce the number of people working and paying
taxes.
127. See EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF
WEALTH IN AMERICA AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2d ed. 2002); Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Notes on Estate Taxes, Redistribution, and the Concept of Balanced Growth
Path Incidence, 86 J. POL. ECON. 137, 137–50 (1978); see also McCaffery, The Uneasy
Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, supra note 123, at 322–24; G.P. Verbit, Do Estate
and Gift Taxes Affect Wealth Distribution? (pt. 1), 117 TR. & EST. 598 (1978); G.P.
Verbit, Do Estate and Gift Taxes Affect Wealth Distribution? (pt. 2), 117 TR. & EST. 674
(1978). For evidence that the estate tax has reduced the net worth of wealthy individuals,
see Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, The Impact of the Estate Tax on Wealth
Accumulation and Avoidance Behavior, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 299,
338–39 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001).
128. See Dodge, supra note 112, at 560–61. It is worth noting that the gift tax
annual exclusion (currently $12,000) does encourage wealth dispersion. ALTERNATIVE
WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEMS, supra note 114, at 17.
129. See Batchelder, supra note 20, at 39–40.
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doing so.130 Our current wealth-transfer system fails miserably at this. In
large part this is because (1) estate- and gift-tax rates are high,131 and (2)
the focus of the tax is on the transferor and the value of the transferor‘s
estate, rather than on the transferee and the value of the assets received
by the transferee.132 The former creates an incentive to find a way to
reduce the taxes, and the latter creates a simple means to do it.
Tax-focused estate planning is not rocket science. As Professor
McCaffery has said, ―The basics of estate tax avoidance . . . are brutally
simple: 1) Give early, 2) Give often, and 3) Give in trust.‖133 At the highend level, we add to this an effort to reduce the taxable value of assets
held by the transferor while increasing the asset‘s actual value in the
hands of the transferee after the tax is imposed.134
In general, a high-end estate plan will consist of one or more of the
following techniques: a gifting program in which the client makes
annual-exclusion gifts135 to a trust for multiple beneficiaries,136 life
insurance held through an irrevocable trust that will not be included in
the transferor‘s estate, the use of entities such as family limited
partnerships to discount the value of assets held by the client,137 sales

130. See Donaldson, supra note 102, at 550–51.
131. The top estate and gift tax rate is 45 percent through 2009 and 55 percent
after 2010. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 950, INTRODUCTION TO ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXES 2 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p950.pdf. In 2010, the one
year when the estate tax is repealed, the top gift tax rate is 35 percent. Id.; see also
WILLBANKS, supra note 15, at 107.
132. See I.R.C. § 2033 (West 2008).
133. MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 68.
134. See Dodge, supra note 124, at 256. This is simple to do. For example, if
Dad owns 100 percent of the stock of a closely held business worth $100 million, he can
transfer 49 percent of the stock to Son in Year One, 49 percent in Year Two, and 2
percent in Year Three. In each case, the transfer is of a noncontrolling, illiquid interest in
the business, which may result in a 30–40 percent lack-of-control and lack-ofmarketability discount in the value for gift-tax purposes. This discount could easily result
in a $20 million tax savings, despite the fact that Son ends up owning 100 percent of the
business. This is a significant problem of having a transfer-tax system that is focused on
the transferor and the transfer, rather than the recipient and the receipt.
135. These are gifts that do not reduce the lifetime gift tax, estate tax, or
generation-skipping-transfer-tax exemption amounts. See WILLBANKS, supra note 15, at
185. The current amount that qualifies is $12,000 per donee per year. I.R.C. § 2503; Rev.
Proc. 2005-70, 2005-47 I.R.B. 979, 984.
136. The gifts generally must be ―present interest‖ gifts. I.R.C. § 2503. The most
common way to handle this with a gift to a trust is to give each beneficiary a limited
withdrawal power. See, e.g., Crummey v. Comm’r., 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding
that a limited withdrawal power held by a beneficiary of a trust makes the beneficiary‘s
interest a ―present interest‖).
137. See Dodge, supra note 124, at 254–63.
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transactions to freeze value,138 charitable trusts,139 and trusts that make
generation-skipping transfers in a way that avoids the imposition of the
generation-skipping transfer tax.140 If the client is married, the plan will
also commonly utilize a trust for the spouse that is specially designed to
qualify for the marital deduction.141 Although a certain portion of the
planning is not tax motivated, there is no question that most of these
complex arrangements are made for the purpose of minimizing or
avoiding transfer taxes. This violates the neutrality principle.
III. ALTERNATE APPROACHES TO TAXING GIFTS AND INHERITANCES
The prior Part demonstrated that our current estate, gift, and
generation-skipping-transfer taxes are not an equitable, efficient, or
neutral way to tax wealth transfers. Does a better alternative exist? If not,
then we might need to accept our current system, despite its many flaws.
There are, however, several alternatives.
A. No Tax
One way to deal with wealth transfers is to not tax them at all.
Congress and President George W. Bush took a huge step in this
direction in 2001 by enacting the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA).142 One of the most significant
changes made by this tax cut was the repeal of the federal estate tax for
the year 2010.143 The GST tax is also repealed for that one year.144
Unlike the estate tax and GST tax, the gift tax is not repealed; instead,
the applicable exclusion amount with respect to gifts is ―permanently‖
fixed at $1 million.145
EGTRRA also makes some significant changes to the stepped-upbasis-at-death146 rule during the year 2010. As mentioned, through 2009,
all assets in a decedent‘s estate generally receive an increase or decrease
in income-tax basis to the assets‘ fair market value on the decedent‘s date
138. See id. This also may incorporate statutorily permissible retained interests,
such as Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts (GRATs) and Grantor Retained Unitrusts
(GRUTs). See I.R.C. §§ 2702(a)–(b) (authorizing the use of GRATs and GRUTs).
139. See Dodge, supra note 124, at 354.
140. See id. at 355–60.
141. See id. at 345–53.
142. Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 1, 115 Stat. 38.
143. Id. § 501, 115 Stat. at 69; Id. § 542, 115 Stat. at 76.
144. Id. § 501, 115 Stat. at 69.
145. Id. § 521, 115 Stat. at 71–72. Nothing is truly permanent in tax law, but
there has not been a significant push to repeal the gift tax.
146. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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of death.147 This unlimited basis step-up simplifies basis tracking for the
beneficiaries and reduces the effect of alleged double taxation.148 In
2010, the unlimited step-up in basis is repealed when the estate tax is
repealed.149 Instead of an unlimited step-up at death, EGTRRA provides
that assets passing from the decedent to any person other than to the
decedent‘s spouse will receive a step-up of up to $1.3 million; assets
passing to the decedent‘s spouse will receive a step-up of up to $3
million.150
Another more extreme approach to wealth-transfer taxation, which
has not yet received serious consideration by Congress, would be to
repeal the estate, gift, and GST taxes while also fully retaining the
stepped-up basis at death.151 This approach would effectively make
whole families the taxable unit regardless of the age of its members, with
tax forgiveness on appreciation at each generation.152 Thus, once income
enters a family it would be free from all future taxes, including on
appreciation, until it is transferred out of the family. This approach
would remove any conceivable wealth-transfer-tax reason for having to
sell a family farm or business upon transfer to heirs. It would also create
two tax classes of people in our society: those who receive significant
tax-free inheritances and those who work and pay taxes.

147. Id.
148. According to attorney Steven Akers, ―The general purpose of the steppedup basis rule is to avoid double taxation, subjecting the same property to both estate
taxation and income taxation when the asset is sold after the decedent‘s death.‖ Steve R.
Akers, Estate Planning under the 2001 Tax Act, in ALI-ABA COURSE STUDY
MATERIALS, PLANNING TECHNIQUES FOR LARGE ESTATES (Nov. 2001). According to
Professor Zelenak, ―[The] [s]tepped-up basis at death . . . serves an important
simplification purpose by avoiding proof of basis problems for small estates . . . .‖
Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 VAND. L. REV. 361, 423 (1993).
149. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, § 541, 115 Stat. 76. Although this is not necessarily the case, if estate and gift tax
repeal under EGTRRA is made permanent, the repeal of the unlimited step-up (and stepdown) in basis also presumably would become permanent.
150. Id. § 542, 115 Stat. at 76–81.
151. In reality, the ―limited‖ step-up of 2010 is not very far off from this
approach, at least with respect to the stepped-up basis at death. First, the step-up is so
large that, in the vast majority of cases, people will still have a full stepped-up basis at
death. Enough deferral rules are in place that taxes could be deferred indefinitely with
recurring ―limited‖ step-ups at each generation. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1031 (West 2008)
(allowing for nonrecognition of realized gain if the proceeds of sale are invested in likekind property).
152. This is a bit of an oversimplification because wealth transfers are not
always limited to intra-family transfers. A person‘s descendants, however, are commonly
viewed as the natural objects of his bounty. See Morton, supra note 1, at 167; see also
Dodge, supra note 19, at 1203–08.
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B. Death as a Realization Event
Canada currently has no wealth-transfer tax; instead, it taxes
accrued gains on all wealth transfers at the time of transfer, effectively
treating death as a realization event, much like a sale.153 Professor Joseph
Dodge of Florida State University has made a very persuasive argument
for making death a realization event in the United States as well.
Specifically, he states that:
According to optimal taxation theory, death is the ideal time to
impose a disproportionately heavy tax, since the tax would
affect economic choices only minimally. Yet the most neutral
income tax with respect to investments would be one that
abolished the realization principle entirely and with it the
preference for capital gains. Thus, as a general proposition,
unrealized appreciation and depreciation, at least of liquid
assets and perhaps of all assets, should be incorporated into the
tax base annually. The deemed-realization rule lies far closer to
that norm than a carryover basis rule, which would allow
indefinite deferral of gain . . . . [A] deemed-realization rule
would have the salutary effect of increasing revenue that can be
balanced by lower rates in general and/or the elimination of
preferences for capital gains.154
As Dodge notes in a later article, the deemed-realization approach
suffers from two problems: (1) there would be a need to value assets at
death to determine the amount of gain to recognize, and (2) liquidity to
pay taxes can be an issue.155 Dodge‘s later article attributes most of the
public resistance to wealth-transfer taxation to concern about double
taxation156 rather than concern about liquidity except, perhaps, with
respect to family farms and small businesses.157 As the later article notes:

153. David G. Duff, The Abolition of Wealth Transfer Taxes: Lessons from
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 3 PITT. TAX REV. 71, 85–107 (2005).
154. Dodge, supra note 5, at 1840 (citations omitted).
155. Dodge, supra note 21, at 446.
156. Id. at 429. It seems that the two most common arguments against estate
taxes are that they are double taxation and that they force people to sell family farms and
businesses, which is effectively a liquidity concern. There are no conclusive studies that
demonstrate which is a greater concern to the general public, although Professors
Michael Graetz and Ian Shapiro have noted that one of the most significant reasons for
the recent success of estate-tax-repeal proponents is that estate-tax supporters have failed
to adequately address the issue of forced sales of farms and small business, even though
there is little evidence that it actually happens. See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at
32–40; see also TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at
15, 25. This information suggests that actual forced sales of businesses and farms are far
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The liquidity demands under a deemed-realization system
would be significant but would be much reduced relative to the
liquidity demands under the current estate tax, due to basis and
loss offsets and substantially lower tax rates. In addition, most
primary residence deemed-realization gains could be brought
within the exemption rule of § 121.
As under the current estate tax, the liquidity problem for
estates would be most acute in the case of closely held (that is,
―family‖) farms and business interests, which also may possess
a low basis. One approach might be to carry over existing
estate tax rules that allow for actual-use valuation (of real
estate). If this is deemed insufficient, a more comprehensive
solution would be to carve out a carryover-basis exception for
such assets within the deemed realization system.158

Although I am unaware of any empirical studies on the issue, I
believe that this downplays the magnitude of the public‘s perception
regarding forced sales or loans to pay taxes.159 If, for example, a person
were to die owning a few highly appreciated investment properties, the
heirs would need to either borrow or sell the assets to pay deemedrealization taxes. Stories such as this would rally the political forces
against deemed realization despite the theoretical soundness of the
approach. In addition, specific provisions applicable to family farms and
businesses contain the same problems that virtually every wealthtransfer–tax-reform proposal has: (1) they are extraordinarily complex,160
and (2) they are unfair to people who happen to not be born into farming
or business families.
less significant in the push for estate-tax repeal than is the public perception that these
forced sales are occurring.
157. Dodge, supra note 21, at 448.
158. Id. (citations omitted).
159. See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 32–40.
160. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2032A (West 2008) (allowing business and farm assets to
be valued at their actual-use value rather than at highest- and best-use value, provided
that various complex requirements are met); Id. § 2057 (allowing a deduction for
qualified family-owned-business interests, provided that certain complex requirements
are met, for decedents dying after December 31, 1997, before January 1, 2004, or after
December 31, 2010); Id. § 6166 (allowing a deferral of estate taxes with respect to
closely-held-business interests at below-market interest rate, provided that certain
complex requirements are satisfied). As should be readily apparent, efforts such as these
to make special rules for small businesses and farms have created extraordinary
complexity for small-business owners and farmers. In addition, there are many questions
that policy makers need to answer and that evade simple but fair answers. For example,
what is a small business? How many nonfamily members can be owners before it ceases
to be a family business? Similar issues apply to farms. See TAXATION OF WEALTH
TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at 22–23.
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C. Accessions Tax
Although we have never had an accessions tax in this country, it is
an approach with many benefits. An accessions tax is based on the
cumulative amount of gifts and bequests received by a particular
beneficiary during the beneficiary‘s lifetime.161 Three common
justifications for an accessions tax are (1) inequality of opportunity, (2)
removing the tax disincentive for gainful employment, and (3) reducing
concentrations of unearned wealth.162 A key benefit of an accessions tax
over the estate tax is that, like any transferee-focused tax (including an
income-inclusion system and an inheritance tax), it encourages wealth
dispersion, thereby helping to reduce concentrations of wealth.163
Despite its benefits, an accessions tax has many problems. First,
although it attempts to tax windfalls, it usually contains a large
exemption amount that dilutes any purported benefit of wealth
redistribution.164 Second, it fails to accurately account for and reduce
wealth concentrations because it does not look at the recipient‘s other
wealth or income.165 Finally, an accessions tax shares some of the same
problems described by Vasek with respect to the current estate- and gifttax system.166 Most importantly, whether true or not, people will perceive
it as a threat to family farms and small businesses.
D. Income Inclusion
There have been many proposals over the years, including the 1894
tax act, to include gifts and inheritances in income.167 The rationale for
this approach is that gifts and inheritances are accessions to wealth and
thus, under the Haig-Simons definition of income,168 should be taxable
like any other income.169 Some advocates of this approach have
suggested that gifts and inheritances should be taxable to the recipient

161. See Dodge, supra note 19, at 1178 n.9. See generally Harry J. Rudick, A
Proposal for an Accessions Tax, 1 TAX L. REV. 25, 32 (1945); Harry J. Rudick, What
Alternative to the Estate and Gift Taxes?, 38 CAL. L. REV. 150, 167–68 (1950).
162. See Dodge, supra note 112, at 560.
163. See id. at 561.
164. See id. at 558.
165. Id. at 562.
166. See supra text accompanying note 98.
167. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
168. Under this definition, income is defined as ―the algebraic sum of (1) the
market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the
store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question.‖
SIMONS, supra note 91, at 50.
169. Kornhauser, supra note 19, at 28; see Dodge, supra note 19, at 1183.
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without any deduction to the transferor.170 Others have suggested that a
deduction should be allowed to the transferor, and the gift or bequest
should be included in the transferee‘s income.171 Others have advocated
for our current approach, which does not give the transferor a deduction
and does not include gifts or bequests in the recipient‘s income.172
The income-inclusion approach is the most equitable of the
alternative ways to tax wealth transfers because it treats everybody
equally. It does, however, have some serious drawbacks. First, it suffers
from the same liquidity issues as our current system. Thus, the public
perception that it destroys family farms and businesses would continue.
Second, because it normally has no special exemption, like the current
estate tax has, many more people would be affected by it. This makes the
income-inclusion approach a much harder sell from a political
standpoint. Third, it raises questions about the taxable unit and how to
treat support obligations with respect to a spouse and minor children.173
Finally, with our progressive income-tax rates, it raises the problem of
income bunching because inheritances would tend to bunch a lot of
income into one year, potentially pushing the recipient into a higherthan-usual income-tax bracket. Commonly, the proposed solution to this
last issue is income averaging;174 however, income averaging would add
significant complexity to the system.175
E. Inheritance Tax
Inheritance tax is a broad term that some people use as a synonym
for accessions tax176 and that others use to refer to any recipient-focused
wealth-transfer tax, including both an accessions tax and an incomeinclusion approach.177 This view would include the hybrid incomeinclusion and accession-tax system recently proposed by Professor Lily
Batchelder of New York University.178 I use the term inheritance tax to
refer to any tax based on the amount that a particular beneficiary receives
as a result of a decedent‘s death or by lifetime gift.179 The biggest
170. See Kornhauser, supra note 19, at 28.
171. See id. at 28–29.
172. Id. at 28.
173. These issues are addressed very thoroughly by Professor Dodge. See
Dodge, supra note 19, at 1202–08.
174. See id. 11181 & n.21, 1190 & n.64.
175. See infra Part IV.B.3.
176. ALTERNATIVE WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEMS, supra note 114, at 7.
177. See Batchelder, supra note 20, at 7; see also Dodge, supra note 112, at 562.
178. See Batchelder, supra note 20. The idea of combining the two was proposed
in very general terms by Professor Dodge. See Dodge, supra note 112, at 551.
179. See Dodge, supra note 19, at 1178 n.8.
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problem with most common forms of inheritance taxes is that the tax
base that is used usually is only based on the inheritance received, and is
not related to the transferee‘s other income, wealth, or gratuitous
accessions.180 Batchelder‘s hybrid approach attempts to address this
issue.
Batchelder proposes that we permanently repeal the estate tax and
replace it with a system in which gifts and inheritances are included in
the recipient‘s income and, in addition, subject to a 15 percent accessions
tax.181 Under her hybrid proposal, which she refers to as an inheritance
tax, each transferee would have a $2.3 million exemption from both the
income inclusion and the 15 percent tax.182 Recipients would take
inheritances with a carryover basis.183 Her proposal is expressly
―motivated by the view that large gifts and bequests should be taxed to
mitigate widening economic disparities, promote equality of opportunity,
and make our tax system better attuned to an individual‘s ability to
pay.‖184 She believes that an inheritance tax would do a better job than
our current system at reducing wealth concentrations, in large part
because a transferee-focused tax would ―reward donors who give more
broadly.‖185 I agree.
Like all wealth-transfer-tax proposals, however, Batchelder‘s
proposal presents problems. First, its effort to utilize a carryover-basis
regime most likely would not work.186 Dodge has identified the
significant arguments against a carryover basis, and they are worth
180. Dodge, supra note 112, at 562.
181. Batchelder, supra note 20, at 2.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 6. She follows this sentence with the following sentence: ―The estate
tax does a good job at accomplishing all of these objectives.‖ Id. This conclusion is not
explained or shown to be supported by data. If the estate tax does a good job at this, we
should not see widening economic disparities that we need to mitigate. These widening
disparities in large part have led me to conclude that the estate tax is ineffective at
accomplishing this goal. A counterargument to this assertion is that wealth inequality in
this country would be even greater than it currently is without wealth-transfer taxes. See
GATES & COLLINS, supra note 2, at 24–25.
185. Batchelder, supra note 20, at 2.
186. As mentioned, we currently are scheduled to have a limited carryover basis
appear during the one year of estate-tax repeal, although it seems unlikely that that
regime will last if it ever takes effect. See supra note 25. For counterarguments, see
Bernard Barnett, The Return of Those Two “Dirty Words”: Carryover Basis, 139 TR. &
EST. 32 (2000); Krisanne M. Schlachter, Note, Repeal of the Federal Estate & Gift Tax:
Will It Happen and How Will It Affect Our Progressive Tax System?, 19 VA. TAX REV.
781, 799 (2000). In 1976, Congress adopted a carryover-basis rule. FEDERAL WEALTH
TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM, supra note 62, at 7. It, however, was repealed before it went into
effect due to outcries about the difficulty of tracking basis. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401, 96 Stat. 229; see FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER
TAX SYSTEM, supra note 62, at 7–8.
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repeating here.187 Specifically, a carryover-basis approach fosters
horizontal inequity among beneficiaries;188 it creates complex fiduciary
problems in determining which assets, with which built-in gain, to
distribute;189 it opens the potential for mistakes by testators, who might
not consider built-in gain issues;190 it would increase the ―lock-in effect‖
compared to the current rule because beneficiaries would seek to
postpone realization, possibly for generations;191 and it would cause
people to assert that basis cannot be determined.192
Second, Batchelder‘s proposal is complex, which is likely to make it
politically unpopular. For example, it uses market value to determine the
amount of inheritance tax owed.193 This makes sense from an equity
perspective, but it creates the potential for double taxation to the same
beneficiary—first when she inherits an appreciated asset and is taxed on
that receipt, and then again when she sells it. To resolve the problem, the
heir is taxed on accrued gain when he or she sells the property but can
deduct from the capital gain ―the share of her inheritance that the accrued
gain represented at the time of receipt, multiplied by her inheritance tax
rate at that time.‖194 The proposal also identifies problems with tracing
basis for certain assets, like baseball-card collections, and suggests a
limited stepped-up basis for these assets.195 In short, the use of carryover
basis, although appealing from an equity perspective, has several
difficulties that ultimately would result in significant complexity.
Third, the proposal creates the same liquidity problems, particularly
with respect to family businesses and farms, as our current estate tax.
Batchelder attempts to minimize this, but the solution is complex, which
would generate public resistance to the proposal. Specifically, heirs
would be allowed

187. Dodge, supra note 21.
188. Id. at 440.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 442,
192. Id. at 443, 448–50.
193. Batchelder, supra note 20, at 21.
194. Id.
195. Id. This approach of looking to the estate‘s other assets to see if there is
enough liquidity to pay taxes is problematic because it does not appear to fully appreciate
the political problems of doing this. As mentioned, under current law, many estates
consisting of farms and closely held businesses have enough other liquid assets to satisfy
estate-tax liabilities. See TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note
104, at 3, 15, 25. The problem is that heirs of these estates assert that taxes prevent them
from meeting day-to-day business needs, investing, and expanding the business. Id. at 3,
15. Regardless whether this is true, the general public will likely believe it to be true, and
this will generate resistance to her proposal.
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to choose to defer taxes due on illiquid assets at a market rate
of interest until disposition, no matter how far in the future.
This deferral election would only be available to the extent that
the tax could not be paid with other inherited liquid assets, after
leaving a reasonable cushion.196
She goes on to note that heirs would need ―to provide the IRS with
periodic valuations of the illiquid asset(s), and the IRS would have a
secured interest in the asset.‖197 I like that her proposal treats farms and
businesses no differently from other illiquid assets,198 although I wish she
would expand her definition of illiquid-assets.199 In short, the complexity
of this provision will create the same political problems that we have
under the current estate tax.
Finally, Batchelder focuses on the very wealthy by using a $2.3
million exemption.200 She acknowledges that she does this under the
assumption that revenue neutrality would be politically necessary.201 My
concern is that an exemption this large does little to help level the
playing field at birth, and it seems a lot like our current system, which
has not done much to level the playing field.
F. Consumption Tax
As the history of our current tax system demonstrates,202 a
consumption tax without a supplemental income tax or wealth tax fails to
base the amount of tax owed on ability to pay because wealthy people
tend to spend a small percentage of their wealth, allowing their wealth to
compound tax free, while poorer people tend to spend everything they
have.
Currently, there are two broad types of consumption taxes that are
popular. First, we see direct consumption taxes in which the tax is
196. Batchelder, supra note 20, at 22.
197. Id. at 23.
198. Id.
199. Specifically, she notes that ―illiquid assets could be defined fairly broadly‖
and ―could include closely held businesses, real property held for investment purposes,
and collectibles.‖ Id. She would not, however, include in the definition of illiquid assets
―property used in part for personal consumption, because its value will tend to decline as
it is consumed.‖ Id. (citing Dodge, supra note 19, at 1199). This is a valid point, but it
aims to increase tax revenue at the expense of a great deal of complexity. This Article‘s
proposal accepts a relatively small loss of tax revenue in the interest of simplifying our
tax system.
200. Id. at 19.
201. Id. She also acknowledges that ―$2.3 million is a lot of money,‖ and that
―an argument could certainly be made that this exemption is too high.‖ Id.
202. See supra Part I.
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imposed on actual purchases.203 This can take the form of retail-sales
taxes on a tax base that may or may not include services, and that often
have specific exclusions for basic necessities, including food and
services such as medical care.204 It can also take the form of a VAT,
which often also has certain exclusions that result in a tax on less than
the full consumption base.205 This type of consumption tax does not need
to separately consider gifts and inheritances; they are merely taxed if and
when spent on consumption by the recipient.206
The second common type of consumption tax looks a lot like an
income tax. This method takes all accessions to wealth in a given year
and subtracts out assets transferred to savings or investment; what is left
is deemed to be taxable consumption.207 The primary benefit of this type
of consumption tax is that it allows the tax system to retain a progressive
rate structure.208 Under this type of consumption tax, cash gifts and
inheritances are generally included in the recipient‘s income, and the
recipient receives a deduction if the cash is invested in business or
investment property.209 Likewise, if business or investment property is
received directly by gift or bequest, it is not included in income, and the
recipient takes the property with a zero basis.210 All personal assets that
are inherited or received by gift or inheritance, including a personal
residence and tangible personal property, will be included in the
recipient‘s income with no deduction.211
The primary problem with all consumption-tax approaches is that
they return us to a system in which the wealthy have even greater

203. See BOORTZ & LINDER, supra note 2.
204. GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 68.
205. Id. A good description of a common credit-method VAT can be found in
GRAETZ, supra note 2, at 65–66.
206. See BOORTZ & LINDER, supra note 2, at 74–75.
207. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 15. Other variations of this idea include
the ―USA Tax‖ sponsored by Senators Nunn and Domenici, see GRAETZ, supra note 2, at
76, and Steve Forbes‘s proposed flat tax. See FORBES, supra note 2, at 59–66.
208. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 78–88.
209. Dodge, supra note 19, at 1199; see also William D. Andrews, A
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974)
(explaining how a consumption tax might fit within a structure that resembles an income
tax). Under this approach, using the cash to buy a personal residence, for example, would
not allow for a deduction.
210. Dodge, supra note 19, at 1199. Thus, if the recipient receives the family
home, a personal use asset, it will be included in the recipient‘s income with no
corresponding deduction.
211. Id. Dodge notes that a tax deferral for personal assets that are consumed
(i.e., giving those assets a zero basis and not including the value of the assets in the
recipient‘s income) would result in what is effectively tax forgiveness. Id. at 1119 n.113.
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opportunities to amass large amounts of wealth.212 In addition,
consumption taxes generally hurt lower-income people, who obviously
must spend a greater percentage of their income on consumption. It is
conceivable under a consumption tax that wealthy families would keep
property invested and growing for generations. This does nothing to
reduce wealth concentrations and the problems that come with it.213 In
short, a consumption-tax approach puts us back to where we were before
the income tax was enacted.214
IV. MY PROPOSAL
My proposal differs from any of the proposals discussed earlier. It
shares some elements of the income-inclusion approach and the
consumption-tax approach, but it cannot accurately be described as a
hybrid of the two.
A. In General
The basic proposal is extremely simple. Essentially, all assets
transferred by gift or bequest are divided into the following two classes:
(1) cash or cash equivalents (―liquid assets‖), and (2) everything else
(―illiquid assets‖). Each class is treated differently.
With respect to liquid assets, they generally should be included in
the recipient‘s income in the year of receipt. However, in order to ensure
that recipients of liquid assets are treated as equitably as possible
compared to recipients of illiquid assets, the recipient of liquid assets
should be allowed an income-tax deduction for any portion of the gift or
inheritance that she transfers to a deductible IRA. This has the added
benefit of encouraging the recipient to save for retirement by treating her
like an employee who may contribute wages to a deductible retirement
plan.215 In essence, the recipient may choose to either (1) pay taxes
currently or (2) defer taxes and subject the assets to the IRA rules. It also
ensures that these assets will be taxed eventually, either when taken as a

212. See generally KAZIN, supra note 36, at 32–65 (describing the growing
concentration of wealth in the hands of a wealthy few under a consumption tax).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 102–105.
214. See supra Part I.A.
215. A distinction, however, is that retirement-plan contributions are subject to
specific dollar limits on the amount that may be contributed each year while this proposal
would allow an unlimited contribution and deduction, up to the amount of gift or
inheritance included in income, for the year of receipt of the gift or inheritance. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. §§ 402(g), 415.
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required minimum distribution from the IRA, or when distributed as
Income in Respect of a Decedent (IRD)216 after death.
With respect to illiquid assets, the recipient should have the option
of either (1) deferring all taxable gain until the asset is sold, if ever, and
taking the asset with a basis of zero, or (2) including the value of the
asset in income in the year of receipt and taking the asset with a fairmarket-value basis. With respect to deferring the gain, the basic idea is
that tax basis is stepped down to zero and taxes will not be owed until the
asset is sold, at which time the sales proceeds would be fully taxable as
ordinary income to the seller. If the recipient should choose to include
the value of the property in income, he would take the property with an
income-tax basis equal to the property‘s fair market value, and all future
gain on sale would be capital gain.
B. Cash and Cash Equivalents
Cash and cash equivalents differ from all other types of receipts
because if a tax is owed on the receipt, it is not difficult to obtain money
to pay taxes. More specifically, no borrowing or lengthy, uncertain sales
period is required. Assets that fall into this category certainly would
include cash and publicly traded securities. It might be expanded to
include other assets, such as gold bullion, if those other assets always
have a ready market, sales generally occur within twenty-four hours of
the attempt to sell, and those assets are not tangible personal property,
such as wedding rings or collectibles, that commonly have sentimental
value within families.
A pure income-inclusion approach would require cash and its
equivalent, as well as other gifts in kind, to be included in the recipient‘s
income in the year of receipt, with the possible exception of allowing for
income averaging to reduce the effect of bunching income into higher
income-tax brackets.217 A consumption-tax approach to gifts and
inheritances would allow the deferral of tax until the money is spent,
potentially allowing for eternal deferral of taxes on liquid assets.218 This
proposal adopts aspects of both approaches.

216. I.R.C. § 691 (West 2008). In general, IRD is income that never was taxed to
the decedent during life and, therefore, is taxed to the recipient of that income as ordinary
income after the decedent‘s death.
217. See Dodge, supra note 19, at 1181 & n.20, 1190 & n.64; see also infra Part
IV.B.3 for a discussion of income averaging.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 207–214.
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1. SPOUSES AND CHILDREN
The treatment of transfers to spouses and children, particularly
minor children, is complicated by the fact that transferors may have a
duty to care for those people.219 In this respect, the gift or bequest may
benefit the transferor at least as much as the transferee. Because of this
unique situation, some special rules are needed. The basic approach
should be that transfers actually received outright by somebody within a
current taxable unit of the transferor220 should not be taxable income to
the recipient.
The taxable unit of the transferor should be defined to include the
transferor‘s spouse221 and dependents. With respect to a spouse, other
scholars have already set forth good reasons for treating them as part of
the transferor‘s taxable unit, and this Article contributes little to what has
already been written on the topic.222 As Professor Dodge has said,
―Spouses pool resources, expenses, and decisionmaking.‖223 Other than
with respect to employee death benefits and life-insurance proceeds, as
described earlier, the beginning and end of marriage, as well as transfers
during marriage, should not give rise to taxable income.224 Payments
after divorce should be treated exactly as they are under the current
Code; that is, alimony payments should be deductible by the payor and
includable in the payee‘s income.225
Dependents, such as minor children, present a challenge. It is likely
that families will try to arrange their affairs so as to avoid inclusion of
wealth transfers in children‘s income. This risk, however, should be
weighed against the fact that tax rules should be as administratively
efficient and simple as possible.226

219. For a summary of state laws dealing with minor-child-support obligations,
see Ncsl.org, Termination of Child Support and Support Beyond Majority,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/educate.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
220. Whether or not the person is in a taxable unit of the transferor should be
determined at the time of outright receipt by the transferee. In this respect, our system
should be hard to complete in the sense that transfers in trust or with split interest gifts,
with the transferor retaining any interest, should not be treated as transfers until they
come out of trust or the split-interest becomes absolute outright ownership by the
transferee.
221. Although the author personally hopes that spouse will eventually be
expanded to include a domestic partner, such an addition from the outset is not politically
wise and would be the death knell of this proposal.
222. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 19, at 1203–05.
223. Id. at 1203.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1204 (citing I.R.C. §§ 71(a), 215, 682(a)).
226. See supra Part II.B.2.
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It seems that the best way to address the issues of administrative
efficiency and simplicity is to work toward uniformity. Some
groundwork is already in place with respect to the concept of what it
means to be a dependent for income-tax purposes. Specifically, section
201 of the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 revised code section
152 to create a uniform definition of dependent.227 Although it might
ultimately prove to be unwise to simply adopt the whole definition for
purposes of determining who is in the taxpayer‘s taxable unit, the
definition is helpful and, perhaps, could be adopted at least in part.
The new version of section 152, which is not without its
problems,228 identifies dependent as either a ―qualifying child‖ or a
―qualifying relative.‖229 Under the definition, the following four criteria
must be met to be a qualifying child : 1) the qualifying child must be the
taxpayer‘s biological child, stepchild, adopted child, foster child, brother,
sister, or a descendant of one of these people;230 2) the qualifying child
must live with the taxpayer for more than six months during the year;231
3) the qualifying child must be either under age nineteen on the last day
of the year, under age twenty-four on the last day of the year and a fulltime student for at least five months out of the year, or any age and
totally and permanently disabled;232 and 4) the person must not provide
more than half of her own support during the year.233
Under the new definition of dependent, the following five criteria
must be met to be a qualifying relative: 1) the qualifying relative must
earn less than $3,200 in income during the year;234 2) the taxpayer must
provide more than half of the qualifying relative‘s total support during
the year;235 3) the qualifying relative must be related to the taxpayer in
certain ways or must have the same principal place of abode as the
taxpayer;236 4) the qualifying relative, if married, cannot file a joint

227. Pub. L. No. 108-311, § 201, 118 Stat. 1166, 1169.
228. See Letter from Francis X. Degen, President, National Association of
Enrolled Agents, to Mark W. Everson, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service (Feb. 6,
2006),
available
at
http://www.naea.org/MemberPortal/Advocacy/Comments/
Everson_Letter_Feb_2006.htm.
229. I.R.C. § 152(a) (West 2008).
230. Id. § 152(c)(1)(A), (c)(2).
231. Id. § 152(c)(1)(B).
232. Id. § 152(c)(1)(C), (c)(3).
233. Id. § 152(c)(1)(D).
234. Id. § 152(d)(1)(B).
235. Id. § 152(d)(1)(C).
236. Id. § 152(d)(1)(A). Specifically, she must be the taxpayer‘s child,
descendant of a child, brother, sister, stepbrother, stepsister, father, mother, ancestor of a
father or mother, stepfather, stepmother, niece, nephew, uncle, aunt, son-in-law,
daughter-in-law, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, or anybody
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income-tax return with her spouse;237 and 5) the qualifying relative must
be a citizen or resident alien of the United States, Canada, or Mexico.238
It seems politically necessary to include qualified children in the
taxpayer‘s taxable unit because there would be public outcry if taking
care of one‘s minor children were to result in taxable income to the
children. Qualified relatives are more complicated. They would include
adult, college-aged children who make little money and who live away at
college year-round. They would also include an aging mother or
grandmother, for example, who makes little money but receives gifts
from her adult child.
The potential for tax-motivated wealth transfers to a qualifying child
seems relatively low if the exclusion from the child‘s income is only
available for outright transfers to relatively young children, as described
later.239 Most taxpayers simply are unlikely to make large outright
transfers to their immature children solely to avoid taxes. The potential
for tax-motivated transfers to a qualifying relative, including an adult
child, seems very high. This leaves two options. First, the proposal could
require that, in order for a dependent to be part of a taxpayer‘s tax unit,
the dependent must be a qualifying child. Second, the proposal could
alternatively define a dependent to be part of the taxpayer‘s tax unit if the
dependent is either a qualifying child or qualifying relative. In either
case, a support limitation, described shortly, should be added. Thus, the
dependent would only be in the taxpayer‘s taxable unit to the extent that
amounts transferred to that dependent do not exceed her support needs.
In addition, with respect to qualifying relatives, it would be prudent to
add an annual dollar limit, such as $50,000, on the amount that may be
excluded from a qualifying relative‘s income.
Longstanding case law addresses the concept of support of
dependents in the gift-tax context. Specifically, in Converse v.
Commissioner,240 the IRS Commissioner conceded that the taxpayer‘s
support of his dependent child was not a gift for gift-tax purposes.241 The
rationale for this rule is that support of a dependent child is not a gift to
the child because the transfer fulfills the transferor‘s legal obligation to
support the child; the transfer represents, thus, consumption by the
transferor rather than a gift to the child.242 To determine what constitutes

with the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer. Id. § 152(d)(2). Thus, a
nonrelated person actually can qualify as a qualifying relative.
237. Id. § 152(b)(2).
238. Id. § 152(b)(3)(A).
239. See infra Part IV.B.4.
240. 5 T.C. 1014 (1945).
241. Id. at 1016.
242. See Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414.

PAREJA – FINAL

880

1/28/2009 3:06 PM

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

support, it is necessary to look to state law243 and possibly to the
economic circumstances of the transferor and transferee.244
In the context of this proposal, the purpose of adding a support
limitation would be to limit the amount that a dependent could exclude
from income. In the context of a qualifying child, the rule could, for
example, say that a qualifying child is included in the transferor‘s taxable
unit for all transfers that do not exceed amounts necessary to support the
qualifying child in her accustomed standard of living. The support
obligation applicable to a qualifying relative is different from one
applicable to a qualifying child because the taxpayer usually does not
have a legal obligation to support a qualifying relative. This is more akin
to support limitations commonly found in irrevocable trust agreements.
This limitation is not tied to any legal duty of the transferor; it solely
would be added to prevent families from using the qualified-relative
exception to make large wealth transfers to family members.245 As
mentioned, it also would be wise to include an annual dollar limit on the
maximum that may be excluded from a qualifying relative‘s income. If
this proposal were adopted in connection with Professor Graetz‘s
Competitive Tax Plan, for example, a $50,000 limitation for a single
recipient would make sense because that is the income exemption under
his proposal.
My proposal does not impose a tax when the dependent leaves the
taxable unit. Although a tax at that time would increase federal revenue,
it seems unlikely to be well received by the general public. A key
problem with including dependents in the taxpayer‘s taxable unit, with
no tax upon departure from the taxable unit, is that it potentially gives the
taxpayer an incentive to make transfers to family members earlier than
she otherwise would in order to avoid generating taxable income to the
recipient. This result is minimized with a support limitation and can be
minimized further by making it difficult to complete gifts for tax
purposes, as discussed later.246 Doing so would mean that most transfers
through trusts would not accomplish the transferor‘s tax-avoidance
objectives. In addition, the possibility of deferral by rolling gifts into an
IRA is likely to minimize the incentive to make outright transfers.

243. See WILLBANKS, supra note 15, at 136.
244. Id.
245. This would include adult children who have low incomes, even if they do
not live with the transferor.
246. See infra Part IV.B.4.
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2. EDUCATION AND MEDICAL EXPENSES
Current law provides that payments directly to a medical or
educational institution to pay medical or educational expenses on behalf
of another person are not taxable gifts.247 This is generally permitted
because people often provide basic necessities to their adult children and
other relatives.248 It seems that there is no good reason to discontinue this
kind of encouragement. Thus, this same exclusion should be made to
apply to income inclusion under this proposal. A wholesale adoption of
the rule currently contained in section 2503(e) as an exception to income
inclusion of liquid assets would be the easiest way to do this.249 This also
could expressly allow for an exclusion for payments directly to section
529 Plans and prepaid tuition plans.250
3. INCOME AVERAGING V. IRA ROLLOVER
Proposals to include gifts and inheritances in income generally
either (1) include all receipts in income in full in the year of receipt,251 or
(2) provide for all income to be averaged over some period of time to
reduce the effect of placing the recipient in a higher tax bracket due to
bunching a lot of income into one year.252 The problem with including all
receipts in income in full in the year of receipt is that people will
perceive it as unfair to tax somebody at a much higher rate because she
receives an inheritance in one year. In addition, the well-advised person
would save taxes by making wealth transfers over a long period of time
rather than at death. This is likely to raise complaints about compliance
costs.
The problem with income averaging is complexity or, perhaps more
importantly, its perceived complexity. The basic idea sounds simple
enough with respect to the inclusion of gifts and bequests in income: take
the amount of gift or inheritance received and divide that amount by the
number of years over which the income may be averaged to determine
the amount that must be included in income each year.253 In practice,
however, there are numerous complicating factors. For example, it is a
realistic possibility that recipients of gifts and inheritances may spend the
money or invest in assets that decline in value prior to paying their tax
247. I.R.C. § 2503(e) (West 2008).
248. See WILLBANKS, supra note 15, at 134.
249. Agency and judicial interpretations of this rule should also be adopted
wholesale as well.
250. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200602002 (Sept. 6, 2005).
251. See Dodge, supra note 19, at 1190 & n.64.
252. Id. at 1181 & n.21.
253. See id. at 1181 n.21.
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liability.254 As a result, the government will need to attempt to collect
from people who may no longer be solvent. As Professor Richard
Schmalbeck has said,
By its very nature, any averaging device involves multiyear
accounting in one form or another. This is inevitably
troublesome in a tax system whose rules are otherwise
organized on the basis of an annual accounting requirement.
While the law is quite clear concerning permissible choices as
to filing status, determination of marital status, and
applicability of any particular rate structure, all these concepts
have to be redefined to deal with a multiyear income-averaging
formula.255
Schmalbeck notes that the complexities involved in prior, now
repealed, income-averaging attempts256 made it highly probable that
taxpayers would ―make mistakes . . . be intimidated by the averaging
schedule . . . and have no sense of the significance of each step in the
process.‖257 He goes on to note that, ―Of course, these facts, together
with the magical savings of several hundreds of dollars of tax per eligible
taxpayer, make income averaging a great boon to the tax return
preparation industry. Indeed, that industry may be the principal
beneficiary of the averaging provisions.‖258
Although income averaging limited to gifts and inheritances over a
short duration is likely to be much simpler than past income-averaging
efforts,259 the general public still will view it as unduly complicated. As
Professor Neil Buchanan astutely noted with respect to economist
254. This is a particular problem because the tax liability with income averaging
is determined up front rather than on a year-to-year basis.
255. Schmalbeck, supra note 102, at 529 (citations omitted).
256. The Revenue Act of 1964 allowed eligible taxpayers to elect to average
their income over several years. Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 232, 78 Stat. 19, 105–12 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 1302); see Schmalbeck, supra note 102, at 510. The rules were
simplified by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 311, 83 Stat. 487, 586–
88 (1969) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1302); see Schmalbeck, supra note 102, at
510–11. In the 1981 tax year, more than 6.5 million taxpayers elected to apply incomeaveraging, resulting in a tax savings of almost $4 billion dollars. Id. at 511. These
comprehensive income averaging provisions were repealed in 1986. Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, Title I, § 141(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2117; see Lily L. Batchelder,
Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 420
(2003).
257. Schmalbeck, supra note 102, at 532.
258. Id.
259. As Batchelder notes with respect to her Targeted Averaging proposal, ―[A]
short time period is simpler because it requires fewer calculations and records of income
from past years.‖ Batchelder, supra note 256, at 423.
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William Vickrey‘s260 famous ―cumulative lifetime averaging‖ of income
proposal, ―[S]implicity is probably best understood—at least in the
context of tax reform—not in the mathematical or analytical sense but in
the on-the-street sense that a simple tax system is one that is easy to
understand, easy to administer, and easy to obey.‖261 Even strong
advocates of income averaging accept that it requires some amount of
record keeping on the part of taxpayers.262 Regardless of the actual
simplicity of the system, the public is likely to perceive income
averaging as extremely complicated.263 In today‘s political climate, this
perception can effectively foreclose any possibility of passing reforms
that include income averaging. Although income averaging in some
situations may be justified if there is a strong public-policy reason for
doing so and if there is no better option,264 this must be approached with
care. With respect to gifts and inheritances, there is a much better
option—the IRA rollover.
Under current law, each individual may transfer $5,000 into a
deductible IRA each year if the individual is not a participant in an
employer-sponsored retirement plan or if the individual is a participant in
such a plan but has an adjusted gross income of less than $52,000.265 An
260. William Vickrey was a well-known economist who won, with James
Mirlees, the 1996 Nobel Prize in Economics (technically called the ―Bank of Sweden
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel‖). Press Release, Royal Swedish
Acad. of Sci., The Sweriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in
Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1996 (Oct. 8, 1996), available at
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1996/press.html.
261. Neil H. Buchanan, The Case Against Income Averaging, 25 VA. TAX REV.
1151, 1207 (2006).
262. William Vickrey, Averaging of Income for Income-Tax Purposes, 47 J. POL.
ECON. 379, 394 (1939).
263. See Buchanan, supra note 261, at 1207.
264. Batchelder provides a good example of a situation in which a form of
income averaging may be warranted. See generally Batchelder, supra note 256 (arguing
that poorer people generally would pay lower taxes if they could use her proposed form
of income averaging).
265. I.R.C. § 219(b) (West 2008). The $5,000 amount is increased for
individuals age fifty or older or who participated in the 401(k) plan of a bankrupt
employer. Id. § 219(b)(5)(B)–(C). These provisions were added by the Pension Protection
Act of 2006. Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 831(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1002. For individuals who
participate in employer-sponsored retirement plans, the $5,000 contribution limit phases
out over an income range of $52,000 to $62,000. I.R.C. § 219(g)(8); Rev. Proc. 2006-53,
2006-48 I.R.B. 996. This provision was also added by the Pension Protection Act of
2006. § 833(b), 120 Stat at 1003. Spouses, who are not participants in employersponsored retirement plans, may each make contributions to his or her own IRA up to the
annual individual contribution limit (i.e., $5,000). I.R.C. § 219(c). For spouses, who are
both participants in employer-sponsored retirement plans, the annual contribution limits
are reduced to zero over a modified adjusted gross income between $83,000–103,000. Id.
§ 219(g)(8). This provision was added by the Pension Protection Act of 2006. Pub. L. No.
109-280, § 833(b), 120 Stat at 1003; Rev. Proc. 2006-53. Numerous special rules, all
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individual who establishes such an IRA generally cannot take
distributions before age fifty-nine-and-a-half,266 and must begin taking
required minimum distributions (RMDs) out of the IRA beginning no
later than April 1 after the calendar year in which the owner turns age
seventy-and-a-half.267 The amount of these distributions generally is
computed to pay out over the individual‘s life expectancy.268 Assuming
that the individual only made deductible contributions to the IRA, then
distributions from it are fully taxable as ordinary income to the
individual or the beneficiary.269
If the individual dies before the IRA balance has been completely
distributed, the remaining funds get paid to the individual‘s
beneficiary.270 If that person is the deceased individual‘s spouse, she may
take a full nontaxable distribution if she rolls the funds into her own IRA
or she may elect to treat the inherited IRA as her own; either way, she
will compute the payout based on her own life expectancy and, in many
cases, may defer taking RMDs until she turns age seventy-and-a-half.271
If the designated beneficiary is anybody other than a spouse, no rollover
is allowed, payment must begin (or continue) immediately, and the
payout generally can be spread out over the beneficiary‘s own life
expectancy.272 As mentioned, all payouts from the IRA after the
individual‘s death that are IRD (i.e., all payouts other than those resulting

beyond the scope of this Article, apply to determine contribution limits. See generally
I.R.C. § 219.
266. I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A). In general, distributions before age fifty-and-one-half
will be subject to a 10 percent penalty tax on top of the ordinary income tax that is owed,
subject to certain exceptions (with respect only to the 10 percent penalty) if the
distribution (1) is upon the death or disability of the participant, (2) is pursuant to a
qualified domestic relations order, (3) does not exceed deductible medical expenses, (4)
is made as a result of an IRS levy on the account, (5) is a ―qualified hurricane
distribution,‖ (6) is a ―qualified reservist distribution,‖ (7) is used to pay medicalinsurance premiums if the beneficiary is unemployed, (8) is used to pay ―qualified higher
education expenses,‖ (9) is used to pay ―first time homebuyer expenses,‖ or (10) is a
return of a nondeductible IRA contribution. I.R.C. § 72(t).
267. Treas. Reg. § 1.408-8, Q&A (3) (2008).
268. See generally I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(9)(A), 408(a)(6), 408(b)(3). The
computation of payout periods from a deductible IRA is beyond the scope of this Article.
269. Id. § 691. The rule is more complex if the individual has made any
nondeductible contributions to the IRA, in which case distributions are handled like
annuity payments. See generally id. §§ 72, 408(d)(1).
270. See id. §§ 401(a)(9)(A), 408(a)(6).
271. See Treas. Reg. 1.408-8, Q&A (5)(a) (2004).
272. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.408-8. The details of these payout rules are
beyond the scope of this Article. However, it is worth noting that, in certain
circumstances, a five-year payout will be required. See generally I.R.C. § 401(a)(9);
Treas. Reg. § 1.408-8.
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from nondeductible contributions) are taxable as ordinary income to the
recipient.273
Under my proposal, sections 101 and 102 would be modified so that
recipients, other than somebody in the transferor‘s taxable unit,274
include all gifts and bequests of cash or cash equivalents in income in the
year of receipt275 with one key special rule: recipients would be allowed
to roll an unlimited portion of any gift or bequest, other than IRD, into a
deductible IRA by April 15 of the year following the year of receipt.
Thus, the recipient could deduct the amount rolled into the IRA from her
income for the year. IRD is treated differently because it never was
included in the transferor‘s income, and the purpose of this proposal is
not to allow unlimited deferral of taxes except where necessary to
prevent a forced sale. To allow for this policy to work, the IRA
contribution limit276 should be increased for each individual by the
amount of gift or inheritance that she receives that year, less any portion
of the gift or inheritance that is IRD. This would prevent families from
using IRAs to make repeated intergenerational gifts and avoiding taxes
eternally. The basic idea is that the IRA rules for members of the
taxpayer‘s taxable unit, such as a spouse, should not change from the
current rules at all. Non-IRD that the spouse or minor child receives is
not taxable income to that person. IRD, which has never been taxed to
the transferor, is taxable income to the beneficiary, just as it is under
current law.
With respect to anybody outside the taxpayer‘s taxable unit, who
would generally be taxed on a gift or inheritance of liquid assets, the
recipient should have the option of rolling that gift or inheritance, or any
portion of it, into a deductible IRA, provided that the inheritance is not
IRD. This approach allows people who inherit liquid assets to defer taxes
somewhat like recipients of illiquid assets, and it also will encourage
donees and heirs to save in a simple, established manner and in a way

273. I.R.C. § 691.
274. See supra Part IV.B.1. This would include spouses and dependants.
Dependants would include qualifying children and qualifying relatives, provided that the
amount transferred to the dependant does not exceed her support needs. In addition,
qualified relatives would not be in the taxpayer‘s taxable unit to the extent that the
transfer exceeds a dollar limitation, such as $50,000.
275. As Professor Dodge has persuasively argued, life insurance proceeds,
deferred-compensation-plan proceeds, and employee death benefits should be treated as
income to the recipient except to the extent that the recipient, or a person in the same tax
unit as the recipient, has paid insurance premiums or made plan contributions out of
amounts previously taxed to the recipient, or to a person in the same taxable unit as the
recipient. Dodge, supra note 19, at 1200–02.
276. I.R.C. § 219(b)(1).
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that will ultimately result in full taxation of the gift or inheritance. If they
prefer to not contribute to an IRA, they pay the tax immediately.277
IRD cannot be rolled into an IRA because it was never taxed to the
decedent. This special rule would prevent liquid assets from being rolled
forward indefinitely without taxation. The whole proposal merely allows
an individual to defer taxes for her lifetime, but not forever. This is
admittedly in contrast to the ability to defer taxes on illiquid assets
forever, but that distinction is necessary to prevent a forced sale or loan
to pay taxes.
4. THE TRUST PROBLEM
Trusts and other ways in which transferors can retain control over
gifts create unique issues with respect to income inclusion of gifts of
cash or cash equivalents. This proposal treats dependents as part of the
transferor‘s taxable unit. Because of this, transferors have a tax incentive
to make gifts to their children while they are still dependents. This
incentive is counterbalanced by the fact that, in my years of estate
planning experience, most parents hesitate to make outright gifts to their
dependent children out of concern that the children will squander their
inheritances. This issue is removed if the parent can make the gift in a
way in which the parent retains control over the gift, such as a trust or a
custodianship. This proposal deals with all these transfers in the same
general way.
This problem can be remedied by adopting a hard-to-complete gift
rule similar to that advocated by Professor Dodge with respect to
reforming our current estate- and gift-tax system.278 The details of such a
rule are beyond the scope of this Article; however, the basic idea of how
it would apply to this proposal is simple enough. In general, the grantortrust rules of sections 671–78 of the Code should be expanded so that
virtually any retained control or interest by a living transferor would
result in our income-tax law treating the arrangement as if no transfer
had been made for income-tax purposes. The basic idea is that tax law
must look to the moment of actual, outright receipt by a living
beneficiary when determining if a gift or inheritance is included in the
transferee‘s income. The concept of outright receipt should be extremely
limited, and it should not be expanded to include general powers of
appointment. If outright receipt does not occur until a time when the
recipient is no longer the transferor‘s dependent, then the asset, at its
actual value at the time of outright transfer, will be fully includable in the
277. More specifically, they would pay the tax by April 15 of the year following
the year of receipt.
278. See Dodge, supra note 124, at 308–09.
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recipient‘s income. Before such time, the assets shall be treated for
income-tax purposes as if still fully owned by the transferor.
Testamentary transfers, transfers without any sort of retained control
that would cause the transferor to continue to be treated as the owner for
income-tax purposes, and transfers that occur upon termination of
retained control are more difficult. The challenge lies in determining how
to tax the transfer of trust corpus, as well as income earned with respect
to the transferred assets, after they have left the transferor‘s control but
before they have been received outright by the ultimate transferee. One
possibility is to allow tax deferral until ultimate distribution. This is the
approach originally suggested by Dodge, other than with respect to large
trusts.279 Specifically, he suggested several years ago that deferral
generally, other than with respect to large trusts, will not result in much
revenue loss, particularly given that the rule against perpetuities
commonly limits the duration of these trusts, resulting in taxation of the
full distribution upon termination of trusts.280 This situation has changed
somewhat since he suggested this because states have since begun to
repeal or expand their rules against perpetuities.281 With respect to large
trusts, he suggested that a simple withholding tax may be appropriate.282
To keep everything simple, my proposal treats testamentary
transfers, transfers without any sort of retained control, and transfers that
occur upon termination of retained control, as fully taxable to the
recipient trust if it has any noncharitable beneficiaries (including
contingent beneficiaries) and if the transferred item is a liquid asset.283
Receipt of liquid assets by a fully charitable trust would be tax exempt.
Receipt of illiquid assets would not be taxable, but basis would be
stepped down to zero, as described later. The trust would then be treated
as a separate taxpayer, fully taxable at trust income-tax rates as under
current law. When an outright distribution is ultimately made to a living,
breathing beneficiary, that beneficiary should be taxed on the full amount

279. Dodge, supra note 19, at 1196–97.
280. Id. at 1195–96.
281. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1-23 (2008) (repealing South Dakota‘s
Rule Against Perpetuities); ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.051 (2007) (expanding Alaska‘s Rule
Against Perpetuities to 1000 years).
282. Dodge, supra note 19, at 1197. Professor Dodge has changed his mind since
he wrote this. See Dodge, supra note 124, at 308–09. See also TAXATION OF WEALTH
TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at 33–36.
283. A similar rule should apply to custodians and guardians. This proposal is
similar to Professor Batchelder‘s proposal with respect to trusts except that her proposal
treats trusts with one noncharitable beneficiary differently from trusts with multiple
noncharitable beneficiaries. See Batchelder, supra note 20, at 24. This proposal would
treat them the same.
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received but allowed a credit equal to the amount of taxes paid that are
allocable to property distributed to that beneficiary.284
5. A CRUMMEY PROBLEM
In order to avoid having every small gift, such as birthday and
Christmas gifts, treated as taxable, Congress enacted the gift-tax annual
exclusion of section 2503(b). This annual exclusion, which is adjusted
for inflation, currently removes all present-interest gifts of $12,000 or
less per year, per donee from the present gift-tax regime.285 This rule,
more than anything else under current law, encourages wealthy
individuals to disperse their wealth among many beneficiaries, which is
good. The problem, as any estate planner knows, is that wealthy families
use this rule for tax-planning purposes, and they commonly give the
maximum amount that they can each year and then continue to give
birthday, Christmas, and other gifts that are often quite extravagant. This
problem was greatly exacerbated with the case of Crummey v.
Commissioner.286
In Crummey, the court held that gifts to trusts count as presentinterest gifts if the beneficiary has an immediate right to withdraw the
funds from the trust, even for a limited duration.287 This rule has made
annual-exclusion gifts to trusts for minor beneficiaries a core component
of estate planning for wealthy families. A rule such as this cannot, and
need not, be extended to this proposal.
My proposal solves the problem completely with respect to gifts
from parents to their dependent children. These transfers generally would
not result in taxable income to the dependent. With respect to gifts to
nondependents, say from a grandparent to a grandchild, it gets trickier. If
these gifts are not cash or cash equivalents, then they will not be taxable
to the recipient until, and if, they are sold, as discussed later.288 If,
however, these gifts are cash or cash equivalents, they will be taxable to
the recipient or, if the recipient is a dependent child, to her parent,
subject of course to the possibility of rolling the gift into an IRA. To
prevent this from happening with respect to small gifts, the proposal
284. A similar approach, albeit utilizing withholding by the grantor or his estate
rather than tax payments by the trustee, is advocated by Professor Batchelder with respect
to trusts with multiple beneficiaries. Id. The main difficulty with this approach lies in
devising a system to fairly allocate the credit.
285. I.R.S. § 2503(b) (West 2008); Rev. Proc. 2001-59.19(1), 2001-2 C.B. 623.
Thus, these gifts do not utilize any of the donor‘s lifetime gift-tax exemption amount and
they do not require the filing of gift-tax returns.
286. 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
287. Id. at 88.
288. See infra Part IV.C.
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would allow for a very small de minimus exception. Specifically, an
outright gift of $600 or less in cash or cash equivalents per year, per
donor should not be includable in the recipient‘s income.289 This rule
specifically should not allow any exception for gifts to trusts, thus
avoiding the Crummey problem. Grandparents could make small cash
gifts to their grandkids, or unlimited noncash gifts, without any incometax implications. Larger gifts would be taxable to the recipient, or the
recipient‘s parents, unless they choose to roll the gift into an IRA. In
addition, payments directly to medical and educational institutions for
medical expenses and tuition would not be taxable to the recipient
regardless of the size of the payment.
C. Anything Other than Cash or Cash Equivalents
Most wealth-transfer-tax-reform proposals allow special carve-outs
for family farms and businesses.290 This approach treats people who are
not in farming or business families unfairly. In addition, these rules are
extremely complex.291 There is a much simpler approach available that
would prevent every single recipient of illiquid assets from having to sell
the asset to pay taxes.
1. STEPPED-DOWN-TO-ZERO BASIS
As mentioned, current law provides that lifetime gifts receive a
carryover basis292 and assets transferred at death receive a basis equal to
the asset‘s market value on the transferor‘s date of death.293 The
unlimited step-up in basis is repealed during the one year (2010) that the

289. This amount matches the Form 1099 reporting requirement. See INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., 2008 INSTRUCTIONS FOR 1099-MISC 5, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1099msc.pdf. Specifically, transferors of nonemployee
compensation of $600 or more per year currently are required to report the transfer to the
IRS and provide the recipient with a Form 1099-MISC showing the amount that has been
reported. Id. This reporting requirement currently does not apply to gifts. Id. The de
minimus exception of this proposal would expand the applicability of this reporting
requirement to include gifts. In short, the amount to be excluded from income under the
de minimus exception should be tied directly to the Form 1099-MISC reporting
requirement. Thus, the $600 amount would be increased in the future if and when the
Form 1099-MISC reporting requirement increases.
290. See Dodge, supra note 19, at 1200 n.114 (noting that a special exception
may be necessary for family farms and businesses). Professor Dodge leaves open the
possibility of extending a special rule to personal residences as well. Id.
291. See I.R.C. §§ 2032A, 2057, 6166 (West 2008).
292. Supra note 17 and accompanying text.
293. Supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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estate tax is repealed.294 Instead of an unlimited step-up at death, for
decedents dying during that one year, assets passing from the decedent to
any person other than the decedent‘s spouse will receive a step-up of up
to $1.3 million; assets passing to the decedent‘s spouse will receive a
step-up of up to $3 million.295 Neither the carryover nor the step-up
approach makes sense.
The biggest problem with a carryover basis, particularly with
respect to transfers at death, is that it is extremely burdensome to track
basis on property acquired by another person, potentially generations
ago. The biggest problem with a stepped-up basis at death is that it
creates what is commonly called the ―lock-in effect;‖ that is, people hold
on to assets until death because they know that all the tax on the gain will
be forgiven.296 The solution to these problems is a stepped-down-to-zero
basis that would apply to either gifts or transfers at death.
The stepped-down-to-zero basis would apply to all transfers of
illiquid assets to people outside the transferor‘s taxable unit, if the
recipient does not include the value of the asset in her income in the year
of receipt. Thus, a gift at death or during life, of a primary residence,
investment real estate, an heirloom, a piano, furniture, or a
grandmother‘s wedding ring would not result in any immediate income
tax to the recipient unless the recipient elects to include it in income, and
the recipient would take that asset with an income-tax basis of zero.297 If
the asset is never sold, even for generations, it will never be taxed. If the
recipient includes the value in income, then the amount included in
income would be the recipient‘s income-tax basis in the asset, and future
gain in an appreciating asset generally would be capital gain. The
purpose of this rule is merely to get at the recipient‘s true ability to pay
without borrowing or selling assets. The goal is to stop the tax-motivated
294. I.R.C. §§ 1014(f), 2210. Although this is not necessarily the case, if estateand gift-tax repeal under EGTRRA is made permanent, the repeal of the unlimited stepup (and step-down) in basis is also likely to become permanent.
295. I.R.C. § 1022.
296. See POPKIN, supra note 8, at 497.
297. This also means that an asset that ordinarily would be eligible for
depreciation will no longer be depreciable because it will have a basis of zero. The basis
technically should be stepped down to the greater of (1) zero, or (2) the amount of debt
assumed by the transferee in connection with the transferred asset. This special rule is
necessary to prevent an heir from having to recognize an artificially high gain upon sale.
For example, assume a person in the 35 percent income-tax bracket inherits a home, and
nothing more, worth $200,000 and subject to a $180,000 mortgage. If the person takes
the home with a zero basis and sells it a year later for $200,000, she will have $200,000
of ordinary income, resulting in a tax of $70,000 (i.e., 35 percent of $200,000). This tax
is three-and-a-half times the true value of the inheritance she received. Instead, she
should take the property with a $180,000 basis (i.e., the amount of debt to which the
property is subject). She would then only have $20,000 of gain upon sale, and a tax of
$7,000 (i.e., 35 percent of $20,000).
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sale of assets in connection with gifts. The concept also makes intuitive
sense because the recipient personally has invested nothing in the asset.
2. TAXING GAIN UPON SALE
When any asset received by gift or inheritance and not included in
the recipient‘s income is subsequently sold by the recipient or any
successor transferee, she will report all gain as ordinary income at that
time.298 Another approach would be to treat all gain up to the value on
the date of transfer to the recipient as ordinary income with any
additional gain as capital gain. This approach is problematic for two
reasons. First, it is complex. As should be apparent by now, a
fundamental goal of this proposal is to avoid complexity. Second, it is
unfair to recipients of liquid assets who choose to roll those assets into an
IRA because everything that comes out of an IRA is taxable as ordinary
income.299
This potential for multigenerational deferral of taxes on illiquid
assets is not entirely equitable to recipients of liquid assets, who may
only defer taxes for the maximum time allowed under the current IRA
rules, but I believe it is necessary. There are two possible ways to
remove the inequity to recipients of liquid assets, but neither is
appealing. First, we could allow for unlimited intergenerational rollovers
of IRA assets. This would effectively convert this proposal into a
consumption tax. The problem with doing that is that it would bring us
back to the problems of the early 1890s; that is, the wealthy could easily
avoid taxation of all capital appreciation forever. Second, we could
impose a tax on the value of the illiquid asset at the earlier of the date of
sale or the date of the recipient‘s death. The problem with this approach
is that it will create the same liquidity problems we have under our

298. A significant additional difference between this proposal and a
consumption-tax approach is that, with a consumption-tax approach, ―[d]eferral treatment
cannot be conferred upon personal assets which represent ongoing consumption.‖ Dodge,
supra note 19, at 1199. As Professor Dodge correctly notes, ―Deferral for personal assets
that are used up through consumption would amount to tax forgiveness.‖ Id. at 1119
n.113. This is completely correct and a valid concern, but, in the interest of simplicity,
this proposal does not make any distinction between personal assets and business or
investment assets. Although this approach will result in reduced federal revenue, it should
not result in significant tax evasion. It seems very unlikely that a transferor would invest
a significant amount in wasting personal assets for the sole purpose of having her heirs
avoid taxes, especially given that the deferral option is available. People despise tax
complexity. In fact, the survival of particular taxes, such as wealth-transfer taxes, may be
dependent on their being extremely simple. It is easy to imagine the complexity that
would result if, for example, a person dies owning assets that are part investment and part
personal-use assets.
299. See supra Part IV.B.3.
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current wealth-transfer-tax system; that is, people will be forced to sell
assets or borrow to pay taxes. Thus, in the face of these two difficulties,
this proposal allows a degree of inequity, as well as revenue loss, by
giving the recipient of illiquid assets the option of deferring taxes until
actual sale of the asset. To minimize the impact of this special rule and to
prevent this from becoming a consumption tax with respect to illiquid
assets only, deferral cannot be extended beyond actual sale by
reinvesting the proceeds in like-kind property.300
3. TAX-FREE EXCHANGES
Several Code sections expressly allow for nonrecognition of
realized gains.301 The usual policy reason given for these deferral
provisions is because we do not want to discourage the taxpayer from
moving money from one investment to a more economically prudent
similar investment.302 In the case of my proposal, that policy reason is
outweighed by principles of equity. More specifically, the initial deferral
of gain on receipt of an inheritance is allowed for one reason only—
because the taxpayer should not be forced to sell the asset (or borrow
against it) to pay taxes. If, however, the sale occurs independently of a
need to pay taxes, the taxpayer should be forced to pay up what is owed.
In short, liquidity has ceased to be an issue.
An argument could be made that this rule would create a lock-in
effect because taxpayers will have to pay taxes if they sell the asset. This
problem, however, will be reduced significantly from its current state
with repeal of the stepped-up basis at death.303 In fact, the stepped-downto-zero basis at death may reverse the lock-in effect for assets with any
income-tax basis, say from additional capital contributions, because
holding on to assets until death would then result in more tax than selling
and paying an immediate tax.304
Personal residences do not generally qualify for tax-free exchange
treatment because they are personal-use assets rather than assets held for

300. This additional deferral is generally allowed under rules such as section
1031. See I.R.C. § 1031(a) (allowing a deferral for trade or business or investment
property other than inventory, stock, bonds, and similar assets). Unlimited deferral of
taxes through reinvestment of the proceeds upon sale would be a consumption-tax
approach. This proposal rejects that approach and, instead, focuses on the liquidity issue.
301. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 351(a), 1031(a), 1032(a), 1033(A), 1035(a), 1036(a),
1037(a), 1041(a), 1042(a), 1043(a).
302. See POPKIN, supra note 8, at 497.
303. See Dodge, supra note 21, at 442.
304. This would occur because tax basis would be lost if the asset is held on to
until death.
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investment.305 Instead, the first $250,000 of gain ($500,000 for a married
couple filing jointly) on the sale of a primary residence is exempt from
income tax.306 Because this is a targeted tax exemption that requires the
taxpayer to live in the home two out of the five years prior to sale, it
seems that this rule should apply to residences received by gift or
inheritance, provided that the recipient meets the two-out-of-five-year
requirement. A contrary rule would compel people who inherit the
family home to sell the home immediately upon receipt and to invest the
proceeds in a new residence, which would make it possible for that
beneficiary to receive tax-free gain on the new property once it
appreciates in value.
4. UNTAXED GAINS AT DEATH
One difference between this proposal and others is that this
approach technically fails to tax the gain that was built into property
owned by the decedent at her death.307 Suppose, for example, that Elderly
Woman owns a piece of real estate worth $200,000 with a $100,000
income-tax basis. If she sells the property before death, she will owe
$15,000 of capital-gain tax, and her son will inherit $185,000 in cash,
which he may roll into an IRA. Assuming he does not roll it into an IRA,
he will owe taxes on an additional $185,000 of ordinary income.
Assuming he is in the 35 percent bracket, his federal tax liability308 will
be $64,750, and he will be left with $120,250 free and clear.
If, on the other hand, Elderly Woman holds on to the property until
death, her son will inherit property worth $200,000 with an income-tax
basis of zero. If he sells the property immediately, he will have $200,000
of ordinary income under my proposal. This will result in a $70,000 tax
liability for him, and he will be left with $130,000 free and clear. The
different result is due to the fact that this proposal does not treat Elderly
Woman as if she had sold the property unless she actually sells it.
A possible approach to taxing gifts and inheritances would be to
treat property owned by a decedent as if it were sold at her death (i.e.,
deemed realization in addition to income inclusion by the recipient),
resulting in immediate capital-gain liability to the estate. This approach,
when combined with income inclusion to the recipient, would result in
305. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 544, SALES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS
ASSETS 11 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p544.pdf; Rev. Proc.
2005-14, 2005-1 C.B. 528.
306. I.R.C. § 121.
307. For a proposal that taxes the built-in gain to the estate or transferor as well
as the receipt of gifts and inheritances as income to the beneficiary, see Kornhauser,
supra note 19, at 54.
308. For simplicity, assume that he lives in a state without a state income tax.
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the beneficiary ending up with $120,250 whether or not Elderly Woman
sold the property. This is a more equitable and technically correct
approach. In the interest of keeping the system simple and avoiding
forced sales or loans, however, this proposal foregoes the tax revenue
that might be gained from this approach.
5. POTENTIAL FOR TAX AVOIDANCE
The biggest problem with this proposal is that it creates an incentive
to convert liquid assets to illiquid assets because illiquid assets allow for
the deferral of taxes over multiple generations309 while liquid assets only
allow deferral over one generation. Because of this, astute planners are
likely to suggest that clients put cash and publicly traded stock inside a
closely-held-business entity (an illiquid asset) in an effort to permanently
defer taxes. To prevent this, the proposal must include an antiavoidance
rule that would treat cash and publicly traded securities held within a
closely-held-business entity, beyond the reasonable business needs of
that entity, as liquid assets. Although this goes against the proposal‘s
focus on simplicity, it is necessary to prevent people from evading taxes.
Of course, at an even more basic level, it could be argued that this
proposal will distort taxpayers‘ behavior by giving them an incentive to
sell liquid assets and reinvest the proceeds in illiquid assets, such as real
estate, farms, and closely held businesses.310 Although this may be true,
virtually all tax laws have some degree of incentive effects. For example,
special rules applicable to family farms and small business under our
current estate-tax law encourage taxpayers to invest in those assets.311 In
addition, the stepped-up basis at death encourages elderly people to hold
on to assets that they might otherwise choose to sell. With respect to this
proposal, the incentive effect does not seem very significant, at least with
respect to appreciating assets, because the only benefit of investing in
those illiquid assets is to defer taxes over various generations rather than
over the owner‘s child‘s lifetime, as would be possible with a rollover
into an IRA. It seems unlikely that a significant number of people would
choose to invest in illiquid assets rather than liquid assets, which provide

309. This assumes that some future recipient of an illiquid asset will eventually
sell it. This is a reasonable assumption because the usual exponential growth in the size
of a family over time will likely cause there to be an increase in the number of owners of
an asset over generations. Because these owners will have different cash needs and
desires, somebody in a family is likely to eventually choose to sell the asset.
310. They initially may also choose to invest in illiquid assets rather than liquid
assets. This Article does not consider whether investments in illiquid assets are more
beneficial to society that investments in liquid assets.
311. See TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY, supra note 104, at
3.
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much greater flexibility, solely to defer taxes over more than one
generation.
The incentive to invest in illiquid assets is arguably exacerbated
with respect to personal-use illiquid assets. As mentioned, these assets
will tend to decline in value as they are consumed.312 This, of course,
effectively will result in tax forgiveness, rather than deferral, for those
assets.313 Despite this tax-avoidance potential, it seems even less likely
that individuals would invest in significant amounts of wasting personaluse assets to avoid taxes. Although a small amount of this may occur,
such as giving an automobile to a child, it will not create widespread tax
avoidance. In addition, to the small extent that this does occur, I believe
that the benefits of having a simple system outweigh the potential
revenue loss. Said differently, it will greatly simplify our transfer-tax
system if taxpayers do not need to distinguish between personal-use
illiquid assets and business- or investment-use assets; the benefits of this
simplicity greatly outweigh the relatively small potential revenue loss.
CONCLUSION
I have, for many years, been a strong advocate of our transfer-tax
system because I strongly believe in the goals that underlie it.
Specifically, I believe that our society is stronger if each individual‘s
wealth and income is more closely tied to her personal achievements
than to the family into which she was born. Although it is impossible to
remove all privilege at birth and although income frequently bears little
correlation to personal achievements, it is a worthy goal to try to level
the playing field.
For many years, I believed that an estate tax focused on the wealthy
did a relatively good job of reducing this birth privilege. Recently,
however, I have begun to question this for several reasons. First, I saw
the very wealthy find ways to avoid or greatly reduce transfer taxes.
Second, I saw the anti-estate-tax movement gain widespread popular
support to the point at which the system‘s continued existence has been
called into question. Third, I saw estate-tax-exemption amounts increase
to levels at which huge amounts of financial advantage can be transferred
between generations with no tax whatsoever. Thus, with very basic
planning, a married couple will be able to pass $7 million tax free to their
child in 2009. A child born into a working-class family, on the other
hand, will need to pay state and local income taxes as well as socialsecurity taxes on what little she might earn in wages. Realistically, she
will have no chance to compete with the $7 million child. That rich child
312.
313.

Supra note 196.
See Dodge, supra note 19, at 1199.
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will be able to pay millions of dollars in cash for a house and will have
plenty left to live extremely well, while the working-class girl may not
be able to save up enough to buy a house. The rich child also will be able
to pay private school tuition, attend schools that open doors of
opportunity, and purchase political influence or political favors. This
kind of wealth disparity is a threat to a stable society.
Because of these observations, I have come to the conclusion that
we need to re-examine our wealth-transfer-tax system. Specifically, we
should find a new system that will not create popular support for
abolishing all wealth-transfer taxes. This popular support for repeal will
exist as long as there is a widespread belief that people need to sell
assets, especially farms and family businesses, to pay taxes. More
specifically, our current system should be replaced with a system that is
transferee-focused. That will encourage wealth dispersion as well as
reduced tax-planning opportunities. This transferee-focused system
should aim to treat everybody equally, regardless whether they inherit a
family farm or family artwork, and it should be designed so that nobody
will need to sell illiquid assets or borrow against those assets to pay
taxes. My proposal does just that.
Although no transfer-tax proposal will ever be perfect, this proposal
is a step in the right direction. It is simple and it would be easy to
administer. It taxes heirs more like wage earners, which is much more
equitable than our current system. It is impossible to predict the revenue
impact of this proposal because that will depend in large part on whether
taxpayers choose to roll gifts and inheritances into IRAs, whether they
choose to include illiquid assets in income, and when they ultimately sell
those illiquid assets. That being said, it seems likely that tax deferral
through IRA rollovers will increase federal revenue as people retire and
begin to withdraw inheritances from IRAs. As an added benefit, this
resulting increase in tax revenue is likely to come at a time when our
social-security system will be feeling its greatest financial strain.

